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FOREWORD
In his third Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph addressing turmoil in the South China Sea region, retired U.S. Air Force officer Clarence J. Bouchat
counters the misperceptions that U.S. landpower plays
only a minor or supporting role in what is normally
considered a predominately maritime- and air-centric
theater. Conventional wisdom’s misunderstanding
of how modern and future landpower capabilities
may influence engagement and operations in semienclosed maritime environments may be the cause for
landpower being marginalized in these environments,
as seen in the original Air-Sea Battle concept or the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
For that reason, I am pleased to present this monograph, which explains the vital role of landpower to
engage the forces of other countries, deter aggression,
and fight if necessary in pursuit of broad U.S. national
interests in the region. In a variety of ways described
here, the essential direct support of land force capability to the air and sea services, and other government
organizations, is also critical to their success when
operating in this theater. As Mr. Bouchat states in his
Introduction, landpower “offers important options
which can often be applied with lower risk of exacerbating direct conflict. As the only form of military
power that covers the full range of military options,
from humanitarian assistance to full conventional
combat, landpower’s flexibility and capabilities help
manage both peace and conflict” in the South China
Sea.
To show how landpower is necessary in this contested region, this monograph briefly explores the
concept of landpower and its components—forces
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from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It then
examines landpower’s contributions to potential combat operations through wide area defense and maneuver to deterrence through forward presence and
peacetime operations, and security engagement with
the region’s landpower-dominant allies, partners, and
competitors. With this understanding of landpower’s
capabilities to support national interests in a semi-enclosed maritime environment and recommendations
to improve its potential in air-sea environments, the
reader will better understand that landpower’s supporting and stabilizing role is especially important in
a theater like the South China Sea.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region.
Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) offer distinctive capabilities
whose defensive nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment tend to be less prone to escalation
while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve to partners and
competitors alike. To establish U.S. landpower as
a critical part of security and stability in the region,
this monograph presents how its wide-ranging capabilities are important in directly supporting U.S. interests. Even in a sea- and air-dominated environment,
landpower’s broad operational and diverse support
capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent
joint and unified operations make it an indispensable
element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower may be
the most decisive, flexible, and versatile force through
full spectrum operations, fully covering the range from
humanitarian assistance to conventional state-on-state
warfare; landpower is also crucial to understanding,
engaging, and influencing people and leaders. U.S.
landpower holds special influence because land forces
dominate this region’s military structure.
The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to
compel or fight and win decisively, is more important
than is normally credited in a maritime environment.
The U.S. Army provides indispensable support to
other forces and agencies through its theater opening
and sustaining abilities. Through its core competency
of wide area security, U.S. landpower is responsible
for passive and active means to protect against external and internal threats. The Army’s air and missile
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defense systems are particularly needed in this antiaccess area-denial (A2AD) environment against preemptive strikes. The security role of sea control from
the land through anti-ship missiles is a historic and influential one in a semi-enclosed sea environment, but
still needs to be operationally developed by U.S. land
forces. The counterland mission through surface-tosurface missiles acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems located around the region. Another core
competency is combined arms maneuver. Amphibious operations are a useful option during disasters
and in the periphery of combat operations around the
South China Sea. Maneuver by air offers another option, but is also vulnerable in the current threat environment. Landpower’s combat capability is a measure
of last resort, but does give credibility to landpower’s
deter and engage strategic roles.
The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower,
to deter and prevent war, is also crucial to stability in
Southeast Asia. Deterrence needs to exhibit the will
to back combat capabilities, which is demonstrated
through the forward presence of troops and prepositioning of equipment and supplies. The advantages
of forward positioning can be gained through using
hardened, dispersed, or temporary facilities. U.S.
landpower’s ability to help mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security related or from natural or
manmade disasters, is another means to show its resolve and capability in the region. The importance of
landpower to deterrence and preventing war is due to
the resolve that land forces represent when committed
by the U.S. Government. With forward presence and
the operational interaction with the forces of Southeast Asia, U.S. forces have more opportunity to assure
partners.

xii

U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states
and shape conditions may well reduce the need for
deterrence or combat. Through security cooperation
and engagement activities, regional states may better understand each other and ensure stability and
security to address U.S. and regional states’ interests.
U.S. landpower builds partner capacity through interpersonal and organizational engagements. Security
cooperation activities also help to develop the capabilities of friendly forces and regional interoperability
through security assistance from the United States.
The forward presence of U.S. land forces reinforces the
strengths and advantages of shaping and engagement
activities. Although all three U.S. landpower strategic
roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent, and engage and shape—are mutually dependent upon each
other, engage and shape may be the most important in
stabilizing the disputes in the South China Sea.
The use of landpower to address the disputes in
the South China Sea is not usually considered in what
is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater,
but the role of U.S. landpower is profound in this arena, and its influence will be undeniable in preventing
war; or, should that fail, winning the peace.
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U.S. LANDPOWER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
“Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

—Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, 1901.

INTRODUCTION1
The use of landpower to help shape the disputes in
the South China Sea is not usually considered in what
is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater.
The conventional wisdom of media, political, academic, and even military participants in the South China
Sea debate is headlined by the U.S. military concept of
Air-Sea Battle that was developed to ensure freedom
of access to the region.2 In part, this wisdom is based
on the fact that within the 122,648,000 nautical square
miles encompassing the South China Sea, there are
less than 5 square miles of naturally occurring land in
the Spratly and Paracel Islands, with China’s current
controversial contributions nearly doubling that land
mass but only adding a tiny fraction overall.3 To further
emphasize the point, no U.S. Army or Marine Corps
general officer has ever commanded U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the U.S. Army only recently
upgraded its senior officer in the Pacific region to the
rank of full General in 2013.4 Even the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) foundational 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report only mentions landpower
in East Asia in terms of its well-established presence
in Northeast Asia.5 Between vast ocean distances and
institutional neglect, what is the role of ground forces
in the South China Sea compared to the seemingly
better-suited platforms of air and naval forces?
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U.S. landpower in the South China Sea should not
be overlooked, because it offers important options that
can often be applied with a lower risk of exacerbating direct conflict. As the only form of military power
that covers the full range of military options, from
humanitarian assistance to full conventional combat,
landpower’s flexibility and capabilities help manage
both peace and conflict in this region. Should the situation come to conflict, sea and air power would be the
primary means of fighting in the South China Sea region. They are what then-Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter bluntly called the “big stick,” while transiting
the South China Sea aboard the aircraft carrier USS
Theodore Roosevelt.6 Landpower is nonetheless important to augment the capabilities found in the other
domains through essential direct support to diverse
joint military operations, interagency activities, and in
its own engagement, deterrence, and strategic combat
roles. Perhaps even more important is that the defensive nature of landpower, when applied in this region,
is less prone to escalation, while still sending an unequivocal message of resolve to partners and competitors alike. Landpower represents a strong element of
“speak softly” engagement to enhance the ability of
countries to defend themselves, gives pause to states
with aggressive intentions, creates networks that enhance abilities synergistically, and may also break
down barriers to misunderstanding—all of which
should result in a stabilizing role for U.S. landpower
through its proper application in the South China Sea.
To show how U.S. landpower is necessary in stabilizing this contested region during America’s strategic
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, this monograph
presents the concept of landpower with its wide-ranging capabilities and its complementary application in
the newly articulated concept of the human domain
2

or the human aspects of military operations. The components of landpower are presented, along with how
it is a required part of joint operations affecting the
air and maritime domains. How landpower supports
U.S. interests in the South China Sea sets the stage to
then explore landpower’s contributions to potential
combat operations, through wide area defense and
maneuver, deterrence through forward presence, and
actual operations. U.S. interests are also complementarily supported through landpower-specific cooperation activities meant to shape beneficial outcomes and
assure regional allies and partners, and positively engage possible rivals like China. Associated with these
findings are recommendations to better execute land
operations in a maritime environment. This monograph will show how landpower is important in a
supporting and stabilizing role, even—perhaps especially—in the South China Sea.
LANDPOWER AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN
Throughout history, landpower has been the
dominant force available during conflict. With later
developments of sea, air, space, and cyberspace power—distinctly articulated by persuasive proponents
advocating for fast and technically based victory—the
concept of landpower has been taken for granted or
simply overlooked. Thus, an overview of landpower,
its attributes, capabilities, and components are needed, along with an examination of connections with the
human domain and other institutions to gauge their
influence on maritime issues.
Landpower is defined by the U.S. Army as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain,
and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”7
This official definition, however, seems too focused on
3

landpower’s role in a crisis and diminishes its other
important contributions to peace and stability. A more
apt definition is “the ability in peace, crisis, and war
to exert prompt and sustained influence on or from
land.”8 This latter definition offers the advantages of
broadening landpower’s role across the six phases of
military operations and widening its reach into each
of the environmental domains of military power to
enable the synergy of joint operations.9 Using this latter definition, landpower is viewed from the strategic
level, meaning “the application of landpower toward
achieving overarching national or multinational . . .
security objectives.”10 Landpower advances U.S. interests through all phases of operations, in all environmental domains, and in support of ground and
integrated joint operations using personnel and capabilities associated with land forces, as stressed by
no one less than USPACOM’s Commander Admiral
Harry Harris in 2016.11
Landpower inherently offers important enduring
qualities and attributes that are necessary to any operation in a maritime-dominant environment. For example, landpower can positively control or influence
targeted terrain and populations, rather than just deny
control to an adversary (as is the mode for air, sea,
and cyberspace operations).12 The corollary to positive
control is that landpower is also “temporally durable”
in that it can sustain its control far longer than forces
in the other domains.13 Since war and peace are extensions of politics, and politics is a human endeavor,
landpower is also a politically decisive force since
only it can discriminately and directly influence or
control human populations to achieve enduring political outcomes “operat[ing] among populations, not
adjacent to them or above them.”14 Landpower is also
the most adaptable and comprehensive of the forces—
4

encompassing missions from peacekeeping and stability operations to major ground combat.15 With these
attributes, “there is no more unmistakable or unambiguous display of American resolve than the highly
visible deployment of landpower,” as declared jointly
by the U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and Commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM).16 Although the
South China Sea region itself lacks land and population, as a semi-enclosed sea fringed by partners,
competitors, and large population concentrations that
control this region, it remains prime ground to apply
the strengths of landpower.
The flexibility and range of roles attributed to
landpower are best described by “full spectrum operations,” which is an illustrative but older U.S. Army
term.17 Since the end of the Cold War, the Army and
Marine Corps have broadened into capability-based
(as opposed to threat-based) forces; making them
more versatile across the wide spectrum of military
operations (see Figure 1).18 Although the Army best
demonstrates this concept through its array and depth
of capabilities and more specialized and numerous
personnel, this notion also applies to the U.S. Marine Corps, which like the Army has recently been
involved in full spectrum operations from stability
and special operations to major combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. According to its foundational doctrine,
The Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, these
full spectrum capabilities enable landpower to:
•
•
•

Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if
necessary.
Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in
any operational environment.
Establish and maintain a stable environment that
sets the conditions for political and economic
development.
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•
•

Address the consequences of catastrophic events—
both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and re-establish basic civil services.
Secure and support bases from which joint forces
can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.19

These listed capabilities are exercised through “winning the clash of wills” inherent in human competition in the recently articulated human domain.20 Each
of these capabilities will be explored further in this
monograph, since each is of great importance in applying landpower in maritime environments through
landpower’s combat, deterrence, and engagement
operations.

Figure 1. Range of Effectiveness of Military
Options.21
6

As nearly all people live on land, and landpower is the predominant force in the land domain, it is
also the dominant force in the human domain—such
that “the human domain, coupled with the land domain, is the crux for decisive action.”22 This intersection between the land and human domains demonstrates a major role of landpower in a semi-enclosed
maritime environment. USSOCOM defines the human
domain as “the totality of the physical, cultural and
social environments that influence human behavior
to the extent that success of any military operation
or campaign depends on the application of unique
capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”23 The British joint doctrine
definition, “the totality of the human sphere of activity or knowledge,”24 parallels the U.S. definition, but
is more apt for this analysis because its broader scope
may include deterrent and engagement activities that
are major landpower contributors to stability using
the full spectrum of military operations. Since peace,
politics, and war are endeavors in the human domain,
they are best conducted person-to-person rather than
by technical means, in order to “figur[e] out how other
people think so we can influence their actions.”25 As
a “conceptualization of the influence that populations
have on military operations,” this domain and its human factors have long been a part of the “military
maneuver space” in terms of culture, religion, history,
economic and political relationships, use of technology, and other human attributes, with some detractors complaining that “institutionalizing” the term as
a separate human domain unnecessarily muddies a
time-tested concept.26 Use of the term human domain
is controversial, even among landpower advocates,
and the concept might better be called by its newly
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coined U.S. Joint Staff J7 term: “human aspects of military operations.”27 Whether a new full-fledged domain
or a traditional planning consideration, taking into account that human psychological factors are important
in modern military operations, this aspect will play a
significant role in U.S. landpower in maritime environments, especially in military engagement activities
and preventing “population centric-conflict.”28
After examining landpower, its attributes, and
its influence within the land and human domains,
understanding the composition of landpower forces
are helpful to establish their importance in the South
China Sea disputes. U.S. landpower is a triad of land
forces from the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command (SOCOM), including their reserve
components, numbering over one million members,
although that may change under U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration.29 “U.S. ground forces
provide expeditionary (especially . . . [U.S. Marine
Corps]) and sustained (especially . . . [U.S. Army])
capability needed to deter or defeat aggression,”30
and USSOCOM’s core competency is its high-impact,
low-footprint combat effectiveness and persuasive
engagement within the human domain.31 The Army
claims the core war fighting competencies of combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special
operations—each detailed in this monograph—which
collectively constitute its offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In support of other military services,
the Army also claims seven enabling competencies
that serve joint and combined operations, also to be
covered in detail.32 Like the Army, the Marine Corps
operates in the land and human domains, differing in
its reliance on the maritime domain as its operational
base in order to be “the right force in the right place
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at the right time.”33 These rapid response capabilities
can “shape the environment, and set conditions to deploy the full capabilities of the Joint Force and other
elements of National Power,” but Marine operations
lack the sustainability and political decisiveness of the
U.S. Army.34 Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not a
separate service, but draw forces from the U.S. Army
SOCOM, U.S. Marine Corps Forces SOCOM, and specialized elements of the U.S. Air Force and Navy.35
Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations, states
that:
Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment.
They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments,
and are characterized by one or more of the following:
time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural
expertise, and a higher degree of risk.36

SOFs are even lighter, faster, and more focused than
Marines, but also less able to sustain themselves.37 In
the South China Sea region, SOFs are especially important for “training, advising, and assisting . . . foreign
forces, enabling them to support their governments’
security and stability,”38 and are well suited for operations in the “gray zone” of conflict between full war
and peace.39 During the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF and conventional land forces attained an
“unprecedented level of interdependence and cooperation” that will continue to serve the United States
well in its pursuit of national objectives.40
One last aspect of landpower must be emphasized:
landpower does not stand alone but is fully integrated
and interdependent with forces of the other domains as
9

practiced within U.S. joint doctrine.41 Expectations in
modern joint operations are no longer for the military
services to be just interoperable, but also interdependent, defined as “the deliberate reliance of one armed
service on the capabilities of another armed service,”42
meaning that the military services “will depend upon
each other for the performance of the majority of
the[ir] roles, missions, and tasks.”43 This results in the
“seamless application of combat power between domains,” or “cross-domain synergy.”44 Thus, U.S. land
forces support and operate in synergy with sea, air,
cyber, and space forces under a joint commander (i.e.,
the commander of USPACOM or a delegated subordinate), and also integrate with the activities of other
government agencies (the interagency in “unified action”) and in multinational (combined) efforts.45 Under these circumstances, the U.S. Army contributes
to joint operations to: “(1) shape the security environment; (2) set the theater; and (3) project national
power . . . [as well as] conduct: (4) combined arms
maneuver; (5) wide area security . . . and (7) special
operations.”46 In a predominately maritime region,
some landpower capabilities that support joint operations, as covered in this monograph, include logistics
and sustainment support, wide area defense, maneuver from the sea, air and sea control from the land,
engineering and civil action, and the creation of a secure environment.47 As lighter, more combat-oriented
forces, special operations and Marine Corps forces
provide much less enabling support to other forces,
instead, needing support for their own long-term activities. Landpower’s support to joint operations is especially relevant in the South China Sea, since its other
core warfighting competencies are clipped by the farflung maritime environment.
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Even in a sea- and air-dominant environment,
landpower’s broad operational and strong support
capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent
joint and unified operations make it an indispensable element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower
may be the most decisive force through persistent
control of terrain and populations in the land and human domains. Land forces are also the most flexible
and versatile force through full spectrum operations,
making it essential at all levels of military operations,
from peacetime engagement to major combat—especially the ability to understand, engage, and influence
people through the activities of SOF and, increasingly,
Army and Marine forces. Landpower’s capabilities
are crucial for attaining the United States’ national
security interests of peace and stability in maritime
environments.
LANDPOWER’S SUPPORT TO U.S. INTERESTS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The United States’ national interests are simple,
broad, and long-standing. They ensure:
•
•
•
•

The security of the United States, its citizens, and
U.S. allies and partners;
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy
in an open international economic system that
promotes opportunity and prosperity;
Respect for universal values at home and around
the world; and
A rules-based international order advanced by
U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and
opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet
global challenges.48
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Each of these interests is directly supported by U.S.
military forces as outlined in the DoD’s QDR report
and other supporting documents.49 For example, the
2012 National Defense Strategy established the “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” emphasizing
support to existing alliances and expanding cooperation with emerging partners, making the first national
interest a prime task for U.S. landpower in the South
China Sea region through its strategic roles of combat,
deterrence, and engagement.50 Deterrence, through
U.S. military forces and its allies and partners, also
supports the economy and an open international system by ensuring free movement through the world’s
busiest waterway and the well-being of a major region’s economy. Landpower addresses this interest by
preventing intimidation, promoting internal stability,
and building relationships in the region.51 Landpower
is especially adept at reinforcing respect for universal
values through military-to-military shaping and engagement activities with other forces in Southeast Asia,
as will also be shown.52 Finally, landpower’s presence
promotes stability and security by reassuring friends
through security cooperation activities and engaging
adversaries beneficially—with additional positive effects from engagement bestowed to the other national
interests as well.53 American values and interests in
the region have remained consistent for decades, but
the importance of landpower in their pursuit has increased in both its harder and softer forms.
These U.S. interests, through the military and
landpower’s strategic roles, are manifest in 10 primary missions assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces by the
DoD.54 Around the South China Sea, landpower, with
forces from the other domains, directly supports the
combat missions to:
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•
•

Deter and Defeat Aggression
Project Power Despite Anti-Access Area Denial
[A2AD] Challenges55

Under deterrence and contingency operations, landpower:
•
•
•
•

[Performs] Counterterrorism and Irregular
Warfare
Provide[s] A Stabilizing Presence
Conduct[s] Stability and Counterinsurgency
Operations
Conduct[s] Humanitarian, Disaster Relief,
and Other Operations56

Engagement activities with partners and rivals build
understanding, cooperation, capabilities, and confidence, useful on their own, but that also strengthens
deterrence and combat abilities.57 To fulfill these missions, USPACOM’s strategy in essence:
USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with
other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the
United States, its people, and its interests. With allies
and partners, USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting
security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military
readiness.58

The subordinate landpower headquarters of U.S.
Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), Marine Corps
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), and Special Operations
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) address the USPACOM
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commander’s intent by supporting access to common
domains, strengthening alliances and partnerships
through security cooperation and engagement, enhancing landpower’s forward presence and posture
in the region, sustaining force projection into the region, assisting others against terrorism and during
disasters, and being ready to fight and win.59 Despite
the apparent environmental limitations the region imposes on land forces, landpower directly supports national objectives in the South China Sea region along
with the other U.S. Government agencies, services,
and international partners and allies.
Where U.S. interests overlap with the interests of
other states in the region, landpower may also support and be a welcome addition to the mutual goals
of stability and security. Even a potential competitor
like China shares interests with the United States as
cited in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS),
which directs U.S. Government efforts to “pursue a
positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China,” a tone that was continued in the
2015 NSS.60 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
noted that both countries have a stake in codependent prosperity and security in the region and thus
need a productive bilateral relationship, which with
time will probably be adopted by President Trump’s
administration, as did initially “tough-on-China” former U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and
George W. Bush within a year or two of taking office.61
A peaceful regional environment allows the Chinese
Government to focus on its “national goal . . . to build
a moderately prosperous society and achieve the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese people by 2050,” which is
key to maintaining its legitimacy; they have also used
bilateral, multilateral, and institutional engagements
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to achieve some common goals.62 Potential and actual
military-to-military exchanges of mutual interest with
China emanating from landpower cover counterterrorism and other transnational threat initiatives, humanitarian and disaster response, peacekeeping, professional education, and building personal contacts
that are indispensable to preventing misperception
and building cooperation, especially important during times of tension (as is covered in more detail later
in this monograph).63 Peaceful development through
successful engagement, both military and with the
other elements of national power, over common interests with China benefits all sides, and landpower is
a robust component in achieving it through security
cooperation efforts that “help ward off miscalculation
and war.”64
Although USPACOM is actively building militaryto-military relationships with China, it must also balance a credible military deterrence and fighting ability
against it because this complex relationship is also one
of rivalry and diverging interests.65 Secretary of Defense James Mattis identified China as one of the three
greatest challenges to the United States since World
War II, remarking that relations with China would
require special management, especially with respect
to the South China Sea,66 since many analysts believe
that China wants to dominate the region and deny influence there to the United States.67 The Chinese military strategy to achieve this:
‘Active Defense,’ states that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] will never take aggressive offensive
action outside its territory, but is prepared to defend
its territory [including] . . . territorial waters and airspace . . . [and] safeguarding its maritime rights and
interests.68
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Active Defense allows the preemptive use of force but
avoids involvement in major wars when possible.69
China’s 2009 reaffirmation of the U-Shaped line in the
South China Sea is part of this strategy to control its
claimed national space, although it was not recognized
by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration in
The Hague in its 2016 ruling and is actively contested
by its neighbors—China’s aggressive enforcement of
its claims has led to clashes.70 The U.S. response to
this has not been a Cold War-like policy of containment, as asserted by the Chinese, but a more nuanced
channel to funnel China’s rise in power and use of
influence toward internationally acceptable methods
and goals.71 American diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad describes the American response as “congagement,” in
which containment and confrontation are used with
engagement to affect a range of activities that a peacetime U.S. military may perform to influence China’s
rise. This results in three possible U.S.-China security
relationships in the South China Sea: first, they may
“establish a security partnership designed to protect
common interests; second, they remain security competitors with an ambiguous relationship; or third, they
become adversarial.”72 U.S. landpower’s ability to
project power from the land and sea as well as engage
peacefully on security issues is part of this “congagement” mix to channel Chinese actions and its ultimate
rise in power in a way that benefits U.S., Chinese, and
neighbors’ interests.73
The United States and the region’s powers need
each other’s support to achieve their shared interests of preventing conflict and developing stability
and prosperity in the South China Sea region, especially for freedom of navigation and access to the
resources of this regional commons.74 The Southeast
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Asian states have traditionally been wary of China’s
growing military capability and assertiveness, which
have put each at an economic, political, and military
disadvantage, but these states have been unable to
coalesce or effectively counter China on their own.75
China’s antagonism sometimes pushes these Southeast Asian states to seek more U.S. diplomatic and
military presence to balance the Chinese hegemon.76
China’s coercion is most recently seen in the “coercive gradualism” or small “gray zone” advances of
dredging reefs into artificial islands and militarizing
them along with advanced A2AD capability and belligerent maritime confrontations.77 China also co-opts
these states through economic dependence as a major
trading partner, with investments and developments
through instruments like China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other interests affecting all, such as energy security and counterterrorism.
Weak U.S. leadership and presence in the region may
have led Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to seek
rapprochement and more balanced relations with a
previously antagonistic China.
Even these beneficial actions worry some regional
leaders for the dependence they foster in an unequal
hub-and-spoke system with China dominating the
center.78 For that reason, the expansion of U.S. defense
and security ties would be welcome. U.S. landpower
can play a reassuring role for these partners through
countering transnational security threats, natural
disaster operations, professionalization of forces, information sharing, building partner military capacity
and interoperability in missions from peacekeeping
to combat, and the simple presence of U. S. forces,
which help partner states to better face internal and
external threats.79 Committing U.S. landpower to the
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region is a strong indication of U.S. determination for
partners and allies’ security; but regional partners balance their diplomacy between China and the United
States, as they are not fully convinced of America’s
commitment to pivot to Asia, or how this may effect
Chinese behavior in the long-term.80 For instance, how
far will the United States support Filipino actions on
Scarborough Shoal after the South China Sea ruling
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration?81 Common
interests and a desire for strategic balance led USARPAC’s former commander, General Vincent Brooks, to
observe, “Many of the countries in the region look to
the United States as kind of an honest broker and a big
brother,” to balance the perceived dominating tendencies by China.82
U.S. landpower’s traits and capabilities may be the
best suited among the military services to perform the
broad strategic roles of “bolstering defense of allies
and deterring aggression; promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation; and
ameliorating the growing United States-China security dilemma” in support of mutually shared goals.83
Landpower plays a prime role because of its inherent
and influential advantages with the militaries of the
Southeast Asian littoral. Even in this maritime-rich environment, few states can afford effective air or naval
forces. The lack of air or naval forces results in regional military structures dominated by land forces which
can best address these states’ most important security
requirements, which are often land-based, “giving
army-army contacts greater weight in military, political, and security affairs.”84 In 2017, the Chiefs of the
Armed Forces of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Brunei were army officers; and the army was the largest and most influen-
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tial force in each of these states as well.85 At the much
lower squad-level, soldiers and marines of the region
also have more in common with U.S. land forces than
their counterparts have with the highly sophisticated
U.S. Air Force or Navy.86 Thus, assistance from the
world’s most credible army, marine, and SOF are often well-received in the region, and these land-forceto-land-force contacts greatly enhance the other forms
of U.S. national power.87
The physical environment makes U.S. land forces
a more influential and welcome stabilizer in the South
China Sea region, ironically for similar reasons why
landpower is often overlooked there. In the insular
and littoral geography of Southeast Asia, the classic
picture of U.S. land forces massing troops and maneuvering over swaths of land is restrained, forcing
it instead to employ its supporting missions, which
present U.S. landpower as a more defensive and less
threatening presence to a rival since its capabilities
in the region are distinct from offensive ones, while
still reassuring partners.88 Forward deploying ground
troops into a contentious region is the most tangible
signal possible of U.S. resolve and commitment by
a casualty-adverse American public.89 Land forces
working in small units within the human domain may
be less visible and thus more politically acceptable
while discreetly operating close to native forces and
reassuring allies with their ability to hold ground.90
Land forces are well suited to perform manpower intensive activities of mutual interest to partners in nonthreatening areas like disaster response, development
missions, and transnational crime while supporting a
U.S. interagency partner through civic action.91 Such
engagement reassures by strengthening the long-term
stability and legitimacy of Southeast Asian partners
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and by giving an American presence a softer, collaborative hue, while still being able to act as a deterrent
in the region.
Landpower cooperating with allies and partners in
this way may help to allay China’s perception of the
threat of U.S. forces deployed around the South China
Sea littorals.92 China’s relationship with U.S. air and
sea power, however, is framed by the Air-Sea Battle
concept that stresses the second part of their “cooperate-compete” relationship, and although a necessary
part of a comprehensive American strategy, Air-Sea
Battle entails danger and risk that needs to be balanced by other approaches.93 Former Secretary of Defense Carter’s earlier reference to the “big stick” is balanced by a “speak softly” engagement of which U.S.
landpower is the main proponent in a (more, but not
entirely) cooperative military relationship with China.94 The USARPAC commander once described land
forces as the “good cop, cooperating with its Chinese
counterparts on such mutually beneficial missions as
disaster relief.”95 Such a U.S. landpower presence and
relationship may benefit all sides by “mitigating some
of the worst fears . . . over China’s rise . . . [while] China
might welcome a pacifying role played by the United
States vis-à-vis aggressive tendencies of American allies.”96 Unlike sea and air power, U.S. landpower does
not challenge any of China’s current main objectives
in the region—such as control of the South China Sea
islands, historic rights to its resources, and protection
of sea lanes and the homeland—nor does it engage in
the most immediate source of friction—close proximity surveillance from China’s claimed waters.97 With
these inherent advantages, U.S. land forces may engage closer with China and the Southeast Asian states
to continue to reassure, build confidence, and bring
stability to their overall relationships.
20

Land forces are an important and adaptive contributor in support of mutual U.S., partner, and competitor interests around the South China Sea through
U.S. landpower’s inherent strengths and capabilities.
If the United States is to channel tensions in the region
toward internationally acceptable forms of growth,
prosperity, stability, and security, U.S. landpower
holds an outsized influence, because: land-force-toland-force contact is the dominate influence in this
region’s military structure; the less threatening defensive nature of U.S. landpower in the area; and its
ability to play the “good cop” through engagement.
USARPAC, SOCPAC, and MARFORPAC are dualmissioned for peacetime engagement and combat, for
instance:
Engaging the theater and working alongside partners
is USARPAC’s first line of effort in a theater campaign
support plan designed to enable the command—by,
with, or through allies and partners—to deter aggression,
build capacity, and assure USPACOM success [italics
in original].98

This soft role for land forces is summarized succinctly
as “day-to-day engagement [that] plays a fundamental role in shaping the strategic and operational security environment . . . vital to communicating intent
and influencing others in the region to address shared
interests.”99 From this firm grounding of what and
who landpower is, how it supports American security interests around the South China Sea littoral, and
its special influence there, how this is accomplished
through landpower’s capabilities is addressed next.
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CAPABILITIES OF LANDPOWER IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA
The balance of cooperation and confrontation
among China, the United States, and Southeast Asian
countries is a delicate one. The Council of Foreign
Affairs’ Preventive Priorities Survey 2017 categorizes
the possibility of conflict in the East and South China
Seas as potentially high in impact, if low in likelihood,
while other commentators forecast confrontation between a rising and established world power.100 For this
possibility, U.S. joint land forces must be prepared for
their combat role in defending U.S. and allied interests, and supporting air and sea power in their roles,
“if for no other reason than to deter [war].”101 Prevention or deterrence of conflict is a second major role of
landpower using its presence and capabilities to reassure partners and to help stabilize against internal
and external political, developmental, environmental
disaster, and military challenges.102 Former U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration worked under
the premise that conflict with China was possible, but
not inevitable, thus necessitating strong U.S. alliances and military capability. Despite its early hawkish
announcements, this may develop to be the Trump
administration’s policy, since Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson’s core foreign policy belief appears be that
the United States needs to reassert itself as a means
of deterrence to reassure Asian allies and to counter
what Trump advisers Peter Navarro and Alexander
Gray described as Obama’s policy of speaking loudly
but “carrying a small stick.”103 The three strategic roles
of U.S. landpower—shape by assuring friends and restraining adversaries through engagement; prevent or
deter conflict by denying an aggressor its objectives

22

through presenting credible combat forces; and win
by compelling an enemy and dominating decisively
when committed—are an efficient framework used
here to analyze landpower’s capabilities.104 Although
parsed in this analysis, all three strategic roles are
interdependent upon each other and other services
and agencies for success. This section presents landpower’s capabilities in terms of its indispensable support to joint operations, its combat roles of wide area
security and maneuver in a semi-enclosed maritime
environment, its contributions to deterrence through
a tangible forward presence and through crisis and
contingency operations, and landpower’s premier engagement abilities to build military partner capacity,
reassure allies, and engage adversaries.
One of landpower’s greatest but most overlooked
contributions to stability and security in the South
China Sea is its foundational enabling support to joint
forces. Because these support functions enable activities for all of the forces of air, sea, and land in their
strategic roles, they will be presented before the specific role analysis of landpower that follows. As the
largest and most diverse in capabilities, the U.S. Army
features prominently as the DoD executive agent or
lead service for a variety of joint combat support and
sustainment enabling competencies directed by DoD
and USPACOM.105 One of the Army’s directed responsibilities, as assigned by DoD Directive 5100.01, is to
“provide logistics to joint operations and campaigns”
or set the theater for joint use of U.S. military forces
and other agencies of the U.S. Government and international forces.106 The Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment
Command provides expertise and depth in these functions that “gives [U.S.] forces extraordinary endurance” in an efficient manner “to campaign for months
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and years, often in harsh environments.”107 Even in a
maritime or air dispute that lasted more than a week,
U.S. military services’ interdependence would require
U.S. Army logistical support for sustaining dispersed
airbases or the opening of ports and airfields.108 This
operational Army task entails deliberate or forcible
entry and theater opening to allow the “reception,
staging, and onward movement” of joint or combined
forces arriving in theater for engagement, deterrence,
or combat activities.109 Once open, the Army ensures
that logistics like food, fuel, ammunition, and medical support are distributed to the military services and
civilian agencies like the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) through its port operations,
helicopter lift, and long-haul trucking.110 Although
the U.S. Army usually sustains joint forces when deployed, U.S. Marine forces can sustain themselves
ashore and logistically support other joint forces for
a limited period.111 Other unsung Army enabling support to the joint forces includes command, control,
and communications. The U.S. Army is the most experienced and forthcoming of the military services
in establishing joint task force (JTF) headquarters for
theater commanders by setting up and integrating
communication systems for all joint, interagency, and
combined forces, and providing tailorable and scalable higher echelon division and corps headquarters
as the command structure for JTFs.112 The U.S. Army
also has a major medical capability in the Asia-Pacific
region, including the deployable 18th Medical Command, offering preventive care, pandemic response,
medical combat care, and intraregional medical transport for the joint forces.113 These and other services,
like intelligence, are the foundation the U.S. Army
lays for joint force operations in the South China Sea
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region. However, the potential A2AD and coercive
gradualism threats around the region mean that these
normally rear-area services are not always safe from
attack and require other landpower capabilities to
defend them and U.S. joint forces.
Landpower’s Combat and Compel Capabilities.
This monograph has made the case that, although
unsought and unlikely, conflict could occur in the
South China Sea region, and any combat involving
the United States by necessity would involve U.S.
landpower. In this semi-enclosed maritime environment, however, some aspects of landpower’s combat
capabilities are restrained, while other capabilities
are accentuated. The Army’s foundational doctrine
ADP-1 categorizes landpower combat as “the ability
to impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if
necessary.”114 This is summed up by landpower’s strategic role of “win,” in which it “must be ready to win
decisively and dominantly when committed.”115 The
caveat “by force if necessary” recognizes a second option of compelling an adversary with threatening or
adverse expectations without an actual use of force in
achieving national interests against an enemy’s will.
Even if combat in the region is unlikely, the credibility of U.S. land forces in waging it is very important
to deter conflict, to shape circumstances, and to reassure allies of their safety, security, and own capabilities. On this point, the retired Chief of the Australian
Army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, observed
that U.S. landpower’s “ability to shape and prevent is
a direct reflection of [its] ability to compel . . . if you do
not have the ability to win as a ground force, people
are less likely to listen to you.”116 U.S. landpower’s
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most important contributions to compel and fight in
the South China Sea arena are associated mainly with
the U.S. Army conventional forces’ core competencies
of wide area security and combined arms maneuver,
shared with the U.S. Marine Corps.117 This section addresses U.S. landpower’s specific combat contributions germane to the South China Sea by analyzing
its DoD directed responsibilities to the joint force, including missile forces to “interdict enemy air, sea, and
space forces . . . from the land”; to “conduct airborne,
air assault, and amphibious operations”; and to ensure wide area security, which will start this section’s
analysis.118
Wide area security is one of the most important
combat capabilities of landpower and a core competency of the U.S. Army. It is the “application of the
elements of combat power in unified action to protect
populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities.”119
The effort to protect an area from hostile threats can
be done cooperatively with host nation forces, in contested areas during counterinsurgency operations, or
coercively by seizing terrain and defending it (the latter scenarios are explained more in the deterrent and
maneuver sections respectively).120 In the South China
Sea region, U.S. Army and Marine forces are particularly adept at enhancing regional security using their
diverse combat support capabilities against threats
posed to land-based joint and partner forces.121 The
most numerous forces in a combatant commander’s
area of responsibility (AOR) are often land forces.
Consequently, they are often assigned to wide area
security through the concurrent use of the branches
of landpower from infantry to engineers, intelligence,
civil affairs, and aviation, to name just a few.122 An
example of these missions includes hardening vul-
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nerable wireless communications with well-buried
landlines using communication and engineer troops
to counter foreign intelligence intercepts and missile
attacks.123 Military police and intelligence forces work
together to defend against attacks of sabotage or insurgency on high-value assets like aircraft or headquarters, as was inflicted on U.S. forces during their
involvement in the American-Vietnam War—a situation easily repeated in the coercive gradualism tactics
practiced today in lower intensity conflicts.124 Within
the intricate coasts and rivers of the region, internal
security and protection may also be enhanced through
the re-emerging concept of Mobile Riverine Forces that
integrate a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
with a Navy river assault group and host nation forces
to patrol and pacify restive areas.125 Although an important capability for shallow water maneuver in this
region, this requirement remains unfunded.126 As the
most numerous and specialized troops for such missions and a well-practiced and proffered command
and control (C2) capability for land control operations,
a land force commander is often designated the Joint
Security Coordinator for the Joint Security Area (JSA)
that protects friendly territory and infrastructure in a
designated, usually rear, area. U.S. land forces would
probably be assigned most JSA duties if one were again
set up in Southeast Asia.127 In addition, joint land forces enabled by U.S. Army civil affairs units often provide essential support during natural or man-made
disasters, and during routine visits and exchanges
they often work “to improve conditions over time and
subsequently increase local and regional stability.”128
These are a sampling of the many necessary, but unglamorous tasks, which usually befall joint land forces
to protect friendly forces, populations, territories, and
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infrastructure when needed by allies and partners.
Also part of wide area security is the defense of territory and people by ensuring air and sea defense from
the land capabilities, discussed next.
One proven function of landpower, as assigned by
DoD to the U.S. Army, is its ability to defend against
air and missile attacks using land-based radar and
missile systems integrated under the joint force air
component commander.129 In the South China Sea region, forward U.S. and friendly bases are vulnerable
to preemptive air and missile strikes from China’s
burgeoning A2AD system, meant to disrupt concentrated in-place or reinforcing U.S. and partner logistics
and combat forces on land and at sea.130 For Southeast
Asian countries, Chinese A2AD systems also have the
potential for political coercion and to contest access to
the South China Sea. Deployed U.S. air and missile defenses, commanded by the 94th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command, are a partial counter to Chinese
coercive gradualism.131 American partners and allies
value these capabilities based on proven engagement
against aircraft, cruise, and ballistic missiles; high system availability rate; concealment through road mobility; and, a relatively low public profile as defensive
systems in host countries. Tactical anti-air and antimissile capabilities are delivered by the Patriot missile
system; while inside and outside the atmosphere, ballistic missile intercepts are conducted at a greater range
by the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system.132 While the first operational deployment of a
THAAD system in 2013 to protect forces in the U.S.
territory of Guam seems to be permanent, none of the
Southeast Asian states has a similar capability. Even
if invited to use Antonio Bautista Air Base (AB), a recently authorized temporary facility for U.S. forces
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on the western-most Philippine island of Palawan,
THAAD’s range of 200 km would cover only a few of
the most eastern Spratly Island features (and hardly
any of the disputed oil-rich Reed Bank) and would
not cover Scarborough Shoal from the nearest Philippine coastline, nor any features from Malaysia’s Borneo coast. The Patriot’s range is even shorter, limiting
both systems to point defense.133 Improvements are
in the process for each, with a future Patriot already
successfully tested against tactical ballistic missiles,
and a proposed THAAD-Extended Range potentially
defending an area 9-12 times its current capabilities.134
Besides range, other weaknesses of both systems
are their expense compared to the threats they counter,
and a limited number of units to fill the much larger
worldwide demand for them.135 Only 15 Patriot battalions and 6 THAAD batteries are operational in the
entire army—eventually growing to 7 THAAD batteries, although a requirement for at least 9 batteries
exists in the fiscally constrained budget. At the very
least, U.S. bases on the southern Japanese island of
Okinawa should also field Patriot and THAAD batteries.136 Additional air defense capability may be available through the Navy’s future Aegis Ashore System
and those already aboard ships, but ship capability
is also in short-supply and meant to defend the fleet,
and which military service would employ a landbased Aegis remains contentious.137 To address these
and other problems, a U.S. Senate bill intends to fund
a “comprehensive operational assessment of a potential future role for U.S. ground forces in the island
chains of the western Pacific in creating anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in cooperation with
host nations.”138 As witnessed by China’s objections to
the deployment of THAAD to South Korea to defend
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against a North Korean menace, China would likely
also object to its deployment to defend U.S. partners
around the South China Sea. As part of landpower’s
wide area security role of defending defined areas and
populations to reassure allies and protect forces and
infrastructure, the limited range and small number
make U.S. anti-air and anti-missile systems deployed
to the South China Sea arena truly defensive systems
against intimidation and for force protection, and not
one of force projection.139
Another vital wide area security mission that U.S.
landpower could play in the South China Sea revives
the role of maritime control from the land. “Coastal
defense was a core role of the U.S. Army in the 1800s
and later, in the first half of the 1900s of the Marine
Corps,” and is well suited as a modern mission in
semi-enclosed maritime environments.140 The Army
Operating Concept, 2020-2040 outlines the U.S. Army’s
role in operating from the land domain in support
of the air and maritime domains as part of the crossdomain synergy that complements the Air-Sea Battle
concept.141 Modernized long-range anti-ship missiles
employed by existing Army missile batteries could
provide a new role for landpower that offers advantages. These include better hardened and dispersed
assets than ship-based systems, increased effectiveness through greater available firepower, less cost
as a deployed force, and when “fielded on a country’s sovereign territory, mak[es] a preemptive strike
against them a significant escalation.”142 In this role,
landpower complements air and sea power by maintaining near constant presence and creating options
for friendly forces through bottlenecks and greater
freedom of maneuver.143 This capability does not now
exist, however, with U.S. Army and Marine Corps
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commanders reluctant to assume such a positional defense role again, choosing instead to emphasize maneuver capabilities during shrinking budgets.144 Some
Army officials, however, support use of land-adapted
RGM-84 Harpoons or the future development of a hypersonic anti-ship missile system for such a mission.145
Both Vietnam and Japan are developing shore-based
anti-ship capabilities to match China’s A2AD, which
offer cooperation opportunities to U.S. land forces. To
increase allied interoperability and decrease acquisition time, the U.S. Army could adopt the Japanese
or another land-based system. Using an allied system would “also promote partnered A2AD networks
among friendly nations” to act both as a stronger deterrent and a more effective weapon.146 With a range of
around 125 km, a land-based Harpoon system would
remain a defensive weapon. However, should U.S. or
friendly land forces employ a weapon with a greater
range, similar to the 400 km Chinese YJ-62 anti-ship
cruise missile already deployed to the Paracel Islands,147 they could cover much of the Spratly Islands
from Philippine shores and—in conjunction with a
deployment to Vietnam—contest sea lanes across
much of the South China Sea while also covering most
of the Paracel Islands.148 Former Defense Secretary
Ashton Carter supported a hypervelocity projectile,
which is a “precision-guided shell that can be fired
from traditional artillery and naval cannons to give
vastly greater range against a wide variety of targets,
including ships at sea and potentially even incoming
cruise missiles.”149 Admiral Harris, USPACOM Commander, envisions the use of “ground-based artillery
to put ‘steel’ into the deep, blue sea—emplacing intelligent sea mines to restrict movement in the maritime
domain.”150 Such capabilities pose an A2AD dilemma
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for China, as the United States is “merely trying to
defend our allies. It’s the Chinese who have to come
out.”151 An anti-ship mission still fits within the definition of wide area security, and adopting this concept
in the South China Sea area has bipartisan support in
the U.S. Congress, which requested a report “as to the
feasibility, utility, and options for mobile, land-based
systems to provide anti-ship fires.”152 China would object to the deployment of land-based coastal defense
systems to the South China Sea; however, they would
be reassuring for allies as the formation of a friendly
A2AD system, a counter to Chinese militarization of
the sea, and could make air and sea control from the
land an “immovable anvil to the mobile hammer of
the Air Force, Navy and Marines.”153
A third method by which U.S. landpower may
counter Chinese power projection in the South China Sea is through land-based attack missiles, which
could complicate aggressive Chinese actions by creating a contested no man’s “land,” forcing China to
deploy defensive systems, not just offensive ones.154
Mobile surface-to-surface missiles can target small,
militarized land features in a semi-enclosed maritime
environment. Land attack missiles act not only as a
“sword” against enemy forces on land, but also as a
“shield” by suppressing an enemy’s ability to project
power, which, along with air and sea defenses, enable friendly entry operations into the theater, and air
and sea power to “form a mobile reserve behind the
land defenses.”155 U.S. Army forces currently use the
MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),
which is a proven precision strike system against stationary or slow moving land targets at ranges up to
300 km.156 Using ATACMS, an expeditionary force
(EF) in the Philippines could range the eastern half of
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the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoals and just
touch the Paracel Islands or China’s Hainan Dao from
Vietnam. Like U.S. anti-air and anti-ship missile systems, the range and availability of current land attack
missiles categorize this as a short-range suppression
system, and so it remains in the wide area security
mission. A missile system that increased ranges to 500
km would cover all of the Spratly Islands from the
Philippines and all of the Paracels and Hainan Dao
from Vietnam.157 Former Secretary Carter also used
the U.S. Navy’s reprogramming of its Tomahawk
cruise missile to target moving ships at sea as an example for modifying ATACMS in the same way. Further enhancing U.S. capabilities is an in-development
joint battle network linking sensor, C2, and fires from
each of the military services so that information may
be passed across systems and services to assist each
other against air, sea, and land targets.158 Enhanced
range and overlapping missile systems would be a direct threat to China’s Hainan Dao, but could counter
the escalation of missile systems already in place in
the Paracel and Spratly Islands.159
Another method of projecting power in a maritime
environment is through the second of landpower’s
core competencies: movement and maneuver used
“to achieve a position of relative advantage” over a
threat.160 The lack of maneuver by land is what some
people consider when diminishing the influence of
landpower in the South China Sea, but amphibious
and air maneuver has had successful historic precedents in the Pacific region.161 The essential purpose
for Air-Sea Battle is to enable maneuver for air, sea,
and land operations in the region to effect “what happens on the land area of the littoral environment.”162
Amphibious maneuver is a core capability of the U.S.
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Marine Corps, under the key Marine Corps tasks of
power projection and littoral maneuver, but one also
assigned by DoD to the U.S. Army and SOF, all with
support of the U.S. Navy.163 The amphibious role manifests in Air-Sea Battle as “seizing and defending advanced bases, particularly remote islands” to control
the sea and air space around them in order to conduct
follow-on operations.164 For this mission, the Marines
use the combined arms MAGTF, consisting of ground,
air, and logistical support elements.165 Unlike historic
amphibious missions, however, the Marines employ
the modern Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept, by
which supporting ships are located over the horizon,
projecting forces with a reduced logistics footprint directly onto or up to 240 miles beyond the beach to create a lodgment or staging area. The advantage of this
ship-to-objective maneuver concept is: its flexibility in
employing 3,000 marines and 15-days of supply with
greater “speed, access, and persistence”; its ability to
avoid enemy concentrations or nodes; that it requires
less prepositioned afloat or logistical assets; and that
it is not necessarily dependent upon use of vulnerable foreign sovereign fixed-facilities.166 Examples of
combat seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver are
the insertion of marines from the Arabian Sea directly
into combat positions in Afghanistan in 2001 and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.167 Although
it entails significant force structure changes, the U.S.
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
is also implementing seabasing to revamp its mostly
atrophied amphibious capability.168 For instance, the
Army is currently training its helicopter pilots to operate from U.S. Navy ships at sea, and is making a priority acquisition for about two dozen multipurpose
landing craft, the Maneuver Support Vessel (Light),
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replacing the Vietnam War era Landing Craft Mechanized or “Mike Boat.”169
The second form of landpower maneuver in this
prevailing maritime realm is from the air, using conventional Army and SOF, which, like amphibious operations, are built upon the Army’s core competency
of combined arms maneuver to gain access and project
power.170 Air operations originate from land bases and
are transported directly to their objectives by the U.S.
Air Force or Army Aviation. Airborne (parachute)
and air assault (helicopter) operations are forms of
forcible-entry to seize key remote, peripheral, or vulnerable rear areas by deploying quickly and stealthily,
avoiding high threat areas, using scalable forces, and
maneuvering to achieve surprise that, along with other offensive options, complicates an enemy’s defense
and gives the joint commander more options to take
the initiative.171 The U.S. Army’s former chief futurist,
Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, observed:
this is not just about fires, it’s about maneuver . . . You
can’t just stand at a distance and shoot, you have to
keep moving . . . constantly presenting [the enemy]
with multiple dilemmas. We’re working very closely
with the Marine Corps in particular on future maneuver by dispersed yet mutually supporting units.172

Despite the advantages and modern capabilities of
landpower’s current air and amphibious forcible entry operations, their use is fraught with risk in a dangerous A2AD environment. First, after many years
of concentrating on counterinsurgency in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the forcible entry and combined-arms
skills of marines and soldiers are unexercised, and
much work is still needed in updating and increasing
equipment, exercises, and doctrine to survive in the
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exposed and threat dense A2AD environment of some
semi-enclosed maritime environments.173 The capability of partner countries is even weaker, as to limit
any combined maneuver operations without much
needed improvement in capabilities.174 China’s imposing air-, sea-, and land-based A2AD systems that
implement its Area Control Strategy were assembled
to challenge other countries’ control in the region out
to the second island chain, making vulnerable U.S.
entry and partner country operations by threatening
facilities, transportation systems, and lodgments as
far as Guam and the Marianas. These systems significantly raise the cost and risk of U.S. and partner political, economic, and military activities.175 Thus, even
when operationally ready again, land force maneuver
from the air or sea would by necessity be peripheral
to avoid the greater risk inherent in it while accountable to a casualty-adverse American public. However,
peripheral does not mean inconsequential. Combat
maneuver missions that U.S. landpower can perform
include the rapid protection of critical infrastructure
(ports or pipelines) or choke points (against A2AD
weapons by nonstate actors, for example), retaking
disputed islands, raids, and halting destabilizing pirate activity (by seizing their havens) especially when
these missions use surprise and are of limited scope.176
Like maneuver, air and sea movement by land forces
are important during contingency and humanitarian
responses in which their mobility, light footprint, and
logistics capabilities offer relief from natural disasters
(like the seabasing response to the 2005 Indian Ocean
tsunami disaster where some local ports were wiped
out); man-made catastrophes (like the Fukushima
Daiichi disaster in 2011); or to perform noncombatant
rescue evacuations.177 The threat environment in the
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South China Sea could make combat use of landpower
maneuver costly, but necessary, to give options to a
joint force commander and dilemmas to an adversary.
The difficulty in forcibly inserting and maneuvering
land forces in the South China Sea dictates their cautious use, and the United States should instead consider substituting concentrated fires into the heart
of A2AD areas as envisioned in the Air-Sea Battle
concept.178
The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to
compel or fight and win, dominantly influences and is
influenced by the other strategic roles, as will be seen
in the next sections on deterrence, and shaping and
engaging. Landpower’s contributions to these roles,
through its inherent capabilities, are greater than is
normally credited in a maritime environment. The U.S.
Army’s major role enabling other forces and agencies
through its theater opening and sustaining abilities as
the lead military service in logistics, mass transportation, communications, medical, and other support is
very important. Through the core competency of wide
area security, the U.S. Army with the Marine Corps
is usually responsible for both passively and actively
protecting forces, populations, and infrastructure
against external and internal threats. The Army’s air
and missile defense systems are particularly needed
in this A2AD environment against preemptive strikes,
although their relatively short range and limited number currently make them defensive weapon systems.
Another security role that land forces could play is
sea-control from the land through anti-ship missiles,
but no such capability currently exists and would require major acquisitions and force structure changes.
However, this would be an important landpower
contribution in a semi-enclosed maritime environ-
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ment and one for which bipartisan support exists in
the U.S. Congress. Although more offensive in nature,
the counterland mission through surface-to-surface
missiles also acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems based around the region and matches the
escalation of Chinese missile deployments. A second
core competency shared by the Marine Corps and
Army is combined arms maneuver to achieve a relative position of advantage over an enemy. Amphibious operations, a mission assigned to all landpower
forces, use the seabasing concept as a useful option
during disasters and in the periphery, but are vulnerable in a dense A2AD environment. Maneuver by air
offers another option, but is also vulnerable in the
current environment. However, landpower’s combat
capabilities in the South China Sea may be most important, not in combat, but in its deterrence value and
contributions to preventing war.
Landpower’s Deter and Prevent Capabilities.
A major component of deterring and preventing
conflict is the perceived ability to conduct combat operations credibly, such that aggressive outcomes by an
adversary are stymied. If a state does not see the costbenefit in its efforts, it will avoid conflict as detrimental
to its interests.179 Thus, U.S. landpower’s capability to
compel and fight, as presented in the previous section,
is also critical to deterrence and prevention “by demonstrating the capability and resolve to apply force in
pursuit of U.S. interests.”180 Plausible U.S. deterrence
is underpinned by landpower to effectively communicate assurances of strong partnerships, a credible military presence, and an ability to deploy forces despite
the A2AD threat.181 U.S. deterrence ensures security
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through strengthening regional governments’ legitimacy, promoting stability and prosperous economies,
and encouraging vigorous foreign and military policy
based on international rules in order to keep partner
governments from being overwhelmed.182 To make deterrence credible, U.S. land forces need to maintain a
sufficient forward presence of forces, adequate prepositioning of equipment to support reinforcements, and
effective crisis and contingency response operations,
which are the major topics addressed in this section.
West Point professor Robert Chamberlain believes
“landpower is the only avenue by which America can
enhance regional security and stability, deter Chinese
militarism and encourage Chinese commitment to the
global status quo” simultaneously.183 In the coercive
gradualism disputes common in the South China Sea,
USARPAC strategy states that the ability to prevent
war is as important as the ability to win a war.184
There is no better way to signal commitment, influence populations, and improve capabilities of other
military forces than to have U.S. land forces interacting regularly with regional states as a stabilizing presence.185 For example, the forward presence of land
forces strengthens military deterrence by offering
more opportunity for direct interaction to improve
host nation military capabilities and interoperability
with U.S. forces—significant enabling factors developed through interpersonal relations, security cooperation, and engagement, as shown later in this monograph.186 Access to host nation bases better leverages
the use of U.S. landpower, while partners and allies
who cannot match American capabilities contribute
tangibly to the partnership through sharing their facilities and territory.187 U.S. land-based forces in the
region also strengthen deterrence by reassuring part-
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ners and allies through sharing their vulnerability,
dispersing and entwining forces among more installations to complicate an attack, and acting as a tripwire
for a U.S. response, the ultimate guarantee of security
for partners and U.S. interests.188 Hosting U.S. forces
may also result in improved or upgraded local combined-use infrastructure and better logistical support
to host forces for equipment and services, especially
those of U.S. origin.189 Because of long lines of communication to Southeast Asia from the United States,
forward presence forces negate the deployment time
and vulnerability-in-transit of forces already in place,
which can then better receive reinforcements and supplies.190 From such considerations the Joint Operational
Access Concept (JOAC) concludes, “The more capability and capacity that a military can amass at the forward base, the more it can mitigate the effects of distance.”191 U.S. policy emphasizes that such a presence
is attained through rotating forces in Southeast Asia,
where the United States has not had permanent bases
or standing forces in decades. Thus, the plausibility
of U.S. military deterrence is premised upon sufficient
forward forces whose presence results in: capable, selfassured partners with whom trusted relationships are
developed; collective interests that share defense costs
and build interoperability; and a more dispersed and
sustainable response to crises and contingencies.192
As part of the rebalance to Asia strategy, the 2014
QDR makes clear that the U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia needs to increase, and indications
are that allies and partners would welcome such a
move—on their terms.193 If U.S. landpower is to exert
its strengths and capabilities, it needs forward locations in order to protect, project power, and engage
with regional forces when called upon. Hosting U.S.
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forces entails one of three options: a few permanent,
regularly-manned, hardened installations that can
withstand attack but may be politically controversial
and expensive to maintain; disperse rotational forces
into more, but less-capable intermediate bases, which
spread vulnerability but are more burdensome to protect and resupply; or temporary use of host-nation
bases, although these facilities tend to be the most
challenging for conducting operations and engagement as they are often austere and unfamiliar.194 An
example of permanent, hardened basing is the U.S.
island territory of Guam, where foreign sovereignty
issues are not a hindrance. In addition to having attack submarine and bomber bases, with fighters,
aerial tankers, and remotely piloted vehicles (PRVs)
coming in the near future, Marine and SOF numbers
are building on Guam, which will make it the regional
hub for amphibious and special operations.195 Protective aircraft shelters, redundant pipelines, shielded
land communications, and advanced logistics represent some of the hardenings that make Guam a formidable, but also an enticing target. For this reason, a
U.S. Army THAAD battery is already stationed there,
and other elements of landpower’s wide area security
should supplement that.196 Dispersing forces to more
numerous, but less improved, intermediate locations
are best represented by the agreement to host 2,500
U.S. Marines with helicopters and aircraft in Darwin,
Australia, on a steady rotational basis meant to improve training, interoperability, proximity to the region, and to disperse forces further.197 Although both
of these force-hosting-options indirectly support U.S.
policy in Southeast Asia as described above, neither
option is feasible for directly hosting U.S. forces in the
region.
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A third basing option, temporarily deploying
forces to host-nation bases for limited periods (sometimes referred to as “lily-pads”), allows U.S. troops to
train other forces, participate in exercises, or quickly
reinforce a partner. Using more numerous and lessimproved facilities on an occasional basis makes them
less inviting targets and offers flexibility to commanders. However, unless using regionally aligned units
recurrently, the force-to-force exchange advantage is
markedly diminished at temporary facilities, and training, exercising, or operating from such sites is more
difficult.198 A good example of this option around the
South China Sea littoral is the 2014 Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines,
in which U.S. forces have regular access to five Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) facilities using rotating forces.199 These facilities offer more advantageous
proximity to the South China Sea, their number gives
strategic depth, targeting them becomes riskier, and
they convey commitment while less adversarial to
China as temporary-use facilities.200 However, the limited number of missile defense systems means some
facilities could go unprotected when pressed into
service or that forces become concentrated onto less
hardened facilities. Such bases are also more vulnerable to the vagaries of diplomatic relations, as comments by President Duterte have made clear about
withholding use of Filipino bases to U.S. forces. Of
the bases offered, only one is a Philippine Army post,
Fort Magsaysay, a key training area more useful for
security cooperation activities than direct defense of
the Philippines. The rest are air bases, which, if levied
into U.S. use, would need missile and ground security
provided by U.S. landpower. Other examples of this
temporary option are deployed land forces for annual
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exercises to Vietnam or Malaysia, as explored further
in the next section. Hardened, dispersed, or temporary
forward basing by U.S. forces could reassure partners,
deter aggression in peacetime, and give positional advantages to U.S. forces in an A2AD environment.201
A necessary auxiliary to forward presence is the
prepositioning of equipment and supplies in forward
locations where forces arriving by air transport can
quickly set up operations using locally stored gear.202
Prepositioning includes conventional combat, special operations, and port opening materials to defend allies and partners or engage with them though
exercises and training.203 Prepositioning is a form
of forward presence with far fewer personnel, and
thus may be more domestically acceptable for some
countries and less likely to alienate host states from
China.204 Prepositioning reduces the A2AD in-transit
risk and response time of deploying U.S. forces during
a crisis, if properly pre-located, and cuts transportation costs for recurring exercises or training.205 In response to Chinese militarization of the South China
Sea, the U.S. Army may respond by prepositioning
additional or upgraded unit combat equipment or by
establishing War Reserve Stocks for Allies to directly
support a partner in the region.206 However, there are
fiscal costs under a constricted budget, from purchasing additional needed material to stock the reserves,
to maintaining and upgrading equipment to keep it
operationally ready.207
In 2016, the U.S. Army began to preposition material in the region through the Army Prepositioned
Stocks (APS) Program, starting with activity sets for
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response
(HA/DR) covering tasks such as engineering, medical care, or civil affairs.208 Prepositioning HA/DR
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sets, under DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,
and Civic Aid program, should be less controversial
to all regional states and would likely be used in a
permissive environment in which stocks may be easily moved around the region with intra-theater lift.209
Under the Philippines EDCA, port opening, HA/DR,
and engagement activity sets may be prepositioned
to serve a variety of missions, although President
Duterte’s suspicions of these sites may hamper their
use while he remains in power.210 In 2016, Cambodia
agreed to host U.S. Army prepositioned HA/DR reserves including de-mining, engineering, and port
opening equipment, as have Vietnam and Malaysia.
The Army is looking to expand this program throughout the Pacific region.211 China will likely disapprove
of prepositioned equipment, especially in countries
that had not closely cooperated before with U.S. land
forces, and thus could fuel a sense of encirclement by
China.212 Such a depot may then also become a lucrative preemptive target.213 In addition to its land-stored
prepositioned equipment, the Army also has two reserves aboard ships to give its stores more flexibility
and less predictability.214 Through the Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, prepositioning of gear
aboard ships is the Marine Corps’ primary reserves
in the region using the 3rd Maritime Prepositioning
Ship Squadron, based in Guam, to resupply a Marine
EF of up to 18,000 marines for 30 days of operations,
ranging from combat to humanitarian assistance.215
Prepositioning of equipment reduces costs, improves
response time, opens opportunities for further engagement, and forms the base for other aspects of
deterrence such as U.S. landpower’s ability to effectively respond to crises and limited contingencies in
the South China Sea region, which are major missions
of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.216
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However, access agreements, capable forces, and
prepositioned material are only part of deterrence.
The demonstrated will to use military force is another
critical aspect that in part is manifested through support to partner and ally states during a crisis or contingency. According to Marine Corps doctrine:
Crisis response and limited contingency operations encompass a variety of military actions, often in support
of other government agencies, to contain or mitigate
the effects of natural disasters or calamitous human
events . . . requiring a military response regardless of
ongoing operations elsewhere.”217

The onset of an emergent situation and its importance
to national interests distinguishes between a crisis
and contingency, but the commitment to maintaining
functionality, stability, and legitimacy in cooperating countries is what makes both types of responses
important for deterrence.218 Countering insurgencies,
terrorism, or violent criminal trafficking are examples
of U.S. landpower’s welcomed involvement in internal security and stability responses that enhance
deterrence.219 U.S. landpower can also oppose opportunistic external aggression through fulfilling security agreements like the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the Philippines and the United States, and demonstrate
support for friendly governments when confronting
coercive gradualism if invoked.220 Land forces, with
other elements of national power, effectively support
deterrence and stability to enable domestic forces to
better support their governments.221 Because of its
specialized functions, SOF has not played a major
role in the landpower missions presented so far, but
during crises and limited contingencies, SOF involvement can be significant.222 For example, Joint Special
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Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P) was a
primarily SOF-led mission that worked and collocated
with AFP forces against dangerous extremists intent
on disrupting Philippine governance in its southern
islands. From 2002 to 2014, U.S. SOF helped to counter
the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah groups through
advising during AFP operations, training Philippine
forces, and rendering humanitarian assistance and
medical projects to improve conditions for indigenous
people.223 Concerns are rising that Southeast Asia may
be in peril by a large number of extremists, who joined
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle
East, returning to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to form a new core for terrorism and insurgency
that may again require the expertise of U.S. landpower to stem, although the Duterte administration now
seems antithetical to more U.S. counterinsurgency
support.224 U.S. landpower’s crucial support to allies
and partners during security responses, best demonstrated by JSOTF-P, enhance regional states’ legitimacy and stability by stopping internal problems that
divert attention from international challenges or by
preventing international aggression from spawning
internal problems, and thus reinforces internal stability and legitimacy to prevent war.
In addition to countering internal and external
political challenges, U.S. landpower is a key player
in mitigating the natural and man-made catastrophes
that could upset stability within regional states.225
The South China Sea borders the geologically active
Pacific Ring of Fire and is the main thoroughfare of
Typhoon Alley, and thus is susceptible to natural disasters “worsened by a lack of disaster mitigation [in]
city planning . . . [and] social infrastructure, and HA/
DR [humanitarian assistance and disaster response]
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capabilities in regional armed forces. Poor disaster
management has the potential to trigger political and
economic unrest.”226 Humanitarian and disaster responses often rely on landpower capabilities to supplement relief agencies and host government efforts,
while under the lead of another U.S. agency.227 The
key response roles of foreign humanitarian assistance
(FHA) and consequence management (CM) complement one another in that FHA relieves or reduces “the
results of natural or man-made disasters . . . [and] is
generally limited in scope and duration,” while CM
are “actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting
from disasters and catastrophes, including natural,
man-made, or terrorist incidents.”228
U.S. landpower is needed especially in these roles
with other agencies: for its rapid response, while
working in non-permissive or austere conditions,
when access is difficult, and after local agencies are
overwhelmed or exhausted. Particularly valued in accomplishing these tasks are the SOFs “geographic orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities,
and the ability to work with multiethnic indigenous
populations and international relief organizations to
provide initial and ongoing assessments. . . . [SOF civil
affairs units] are particularly well-suited for stabilization efforts in disaster areas” because they have the
expertise to best liaison with civil organizations, and
can integrate and direct essential military functions.229
To mitigate disasters, conventional Army and Marine
Corps forces enable security, logistics, engineering,
transport, medical, and command and communications support to restore infrastructure and protect and
sustain victims.230 An example of landpower acting in
FHA was in November 2013, when nearly 1,000 U.S.
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marines and their aircraft, supported by U.S. Navy
assets, responded to the devastation of the central
Philippines by Super Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest
typhoon ever recorded. With USAID as the lead U.S.
agency, and while coordinating closely with the AFP,
JTF 505 cleared roads and opened airports, provided
vital communications support, conducted search and
rescue operations, gave medical care, transported aid
workers, distributed 2,495 tons of relief supplies, and
evacuated 21,000 people—thereby ameliorating a humanitarian disaster.231 Other recent examples of U.S.
land forces significantly supporting relief operations
include the 2011 seismic and nuclear disaster in central
Japan, the 2015 response to Typhoon Soudelor in the
Northern Marianas and the earthquakes in Nepal, and
the 2016 earthquake in southern Japan.232 Elements of
deterrence, such as regular cooperation and forward
basing, enhance crisis and contingency responses to
security and humanitarian issues, but response operations also bolster deterrence and support closer ties
and mutual interests like respect for human values.233
The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower—deter and prevent war—is crucial to stability in
Southeast Asia and reinforces landpower’s other strategic roles. Credible deterrence that thwarts an adversary’s aggressive intentions requires the operational
capabilities that U.S. landpower offers, as covered in
the combat and compel section of this monograph.
However, deterrence also needs to exhibit the will to
back those capabilities that are demonstrated through
the forward presence of troops and prepositioning
of equipment, thus making plausible U.S. intentions
in the South China Sea region. The advantage of forward positioned troops can be gained through hardened, dispersed, or temporary facilities that result in
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reduced cost and risk with increased speed of deployments, and improved support and engagement of
allies and partners. U.S. landpower’s ability to help
mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security
related or natural or man-made disasters, “employ[s]
military capabilities alongside partners with very little to no strategic warning, in effect serving as a useful demonstration of latent U.S. contingency response
capability,” as shown by JSOTF-P and JTF 505 in the
Philippines.234 U.S. landpower’s presence in the region also has a stabilizing effect by being a committed
but defensive signal of American interests in support
of partners, humanitarian values, and international
norms in much the same way U.S. Forces Korea’s
landpower has for over 60 years. This is because of
the resolve that land forces represent when committed by the U.S. Government, and the powerful influence landpower wields in the human domain “largely
because it puts U.S. forces in direct contact with those
they seek to influence; whether by deterring or halting
enemies, or by convincing civilian policymakers and
populations that they share objectives and priorities
with the United States.”235 With forward presence and
operationally interacting with the forces of Southeast
Asia, U.S. forces have more opportunity to assure
partners while improving host nation military capabilities and interoperability through the shaping and
engagement actions of security cooperation, which are
presented next.
Landpower’s Engage and Shape Capabilities.
The third strategic role of U.S. landpower—to engage states and shape conditions—may be the most
important because it sets the foundation for U.S. and
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regional forces to win or prevent conflict.236 Shaping
is the establishment of conditions in which U.S. and
partners’ interests may be met by favorably influencing the operational area and the human domain.237
These conducive future conditions are attained during
operational planning’s Phase Zero through a variety
of peacetime security cooperation, engagement, and
bilateral and multinational activities.238 Shaping operations squarely align with a third of the U.S. Army’s
missions, to “provide a global stabilizing presence,”
and more specifically with its proposed core capability to “shape the security environment.”239 Military
engagement is the art of shaping human activities
through interactions between U.S. and other countries’
forces “designed to build trust and confidence, share
information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence” in order to better understand and affect the security and human environments.240 “Engage
and partner” is a critical line of effort for USARPAC’s
“operations, actions, and activities to assure security
and stability.” Similarly, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine
states that military engagement and security cooperation “build partnerships that promote a collective
approach to mutual security concerns,” and in joint
doctrine for SOF it serves to reduce daily tensions,
collect information to forewarn of crisis, and “develop
and build [host nation] capabilities and capacities that
can be leveraged in crises and war.”241 A more specific form of engagement with respect to China is also
used in this monograph as the “means to improve the
non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s
behavior . . . [to] induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the
dominant international order.”242 With the U.S. State
Department as the lead agency for foreign policy,
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these are tasks in which landpower excels because of
the human-to-human contact with the powerful land
forces in the region, but which play a mainly protective, non-threatening role around the South China
Sea.243 The rest of this monograph explains how engagement and shaping address U.S. interests through
capacity building and security cooperation with allies,
partners, and other countries in the region.244
Shaping and engagement are important to U.S. and
partner interests because they create a favorable environment and future in which to operate. U.S. landpower is a major tool in creating that environment
through building partner capacity (BPC), described
by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as
“helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them
with equipment, training, or other forms of security
assistance.”245 The intent of BPC is to help partners
meet basic defense needs and build self-confidence
in their security capabilities in order to contribute to
regional security with the United States and other
partners.246 For the United States, BPC offers the advantages of sharing costs and responsibilities for local
and collective security with other countries, exerting
positive U.S. leadership in attaining mutual interests,
and bolstering defense credibility through multilateral and regional ties—and doing so cost-effectively.247
For U.S. landpower in particular, BPC improves military preparedness and interoperability with partners,
spreads “burden-sharing and harnesses economies
of scale based on common systems,” may cover regional shortfalls in U.S. capabilities and capacity, and
“shortens friendly response times and increases uncertainty for an adversary.”248 U.S. landpower’s BPC
has recently developed counterterrorism, counterin-
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surgency, and disaster assistance skills with the many
countries sharing an interest in the South China Sea
region, but it also develops full spectrum partner capabilities against A2AD threats in areas that U.S. landpower has the expertise to share.249 DoD’s $425 million
Southeast Asia Reassurance Fund is a BPC initiative
meant mainly to improve at-sea capabilities for partners, but it could also enhance landpower’s fires and
maneuver at sea by investing in the maritime domain
awareness initiative from which air, sea, and land
forces synergistically benefit, especially if enhancing
nascent collective security efforts coordinated with
regional leaders like Australia and Japan.250 BPC is an
important element of statecraft and security in Southeast Asia, and U.S. landpower plays a major role in its
effectiveness.
A multiplying factor in BPC (and for combat and
deterrence missions) is the interpersonal and organizational relations in which U.S. landpower excels. The
expertise in regional and cultural matters leveraged by
SOF, regionally aligned conventional land forces, forward presence units, and specialist foreign area officers builds stronger partnerships and engages friends
and competitors in enduring relationships that make
other efforts more effective—especially in disaster response and foreign internal defense.251 These contacts
potentially benefit both partners through improved
capabilities and assurances of U.S. support, but they
also enable a “land network of relationships resulting
in early warning, indigenous solutions . . . informed
campaigns,” shared intelligence, realistic training,
and increased cultural awareness that benefit overall
U.S. interests as well.252 Shaping and influencing other
populations is a difficult, inexact art that can be counterproductive if done poorly; but fruitful interactions
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are invaluable if at least for the better understanding
of the other’s fundamental objectives that may identify areas of mutual interest.253 If done well, BPC can
progress to the point where the United States does not
need to be the regional initiator of such efforts, but
instead like-minded states train and exercise together,
reinforcing intra-regional ties and building credible
collective security.254 U.S. landpower is attractive to
regional military forces because of its flexible array
of much-needed combat and combat support capabilities (as detailed in the combat and compel section)
delivered through BPC by experts in military and
civilian fields—the latter in the form of reserve component soldiers and marines offering excellent insight
into civil-military relations.255 These very influential
land-force-to-land-force ties within Southeast Asia
also benefit U.S. air and sea forces and other government agencies through greater partner confidence in
the United States and improved access to partners.256
An example is the improving of U.S. military ties with
Vietnam to help integrate that country into the current
international order, which opens doors to address security issues of mutual concern.257 U.S. landpower’s
abilities to assure and engage in the human domain
are a boon to the United States, its regional partners,
and other states.
The formal term for the many security interactions
described in this monograph is security cooperation,
defined as DoD:
interactions with foreign defense establishments to
build defense relationships that promote specific US
security interests, develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.258
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Security cooperation, also previously known as military-to-military activities, is a key element of shaping
and engaging operations at the strategic level and is
usually conducted under the funding and oversight
of the State Department as a part of U.S. foreign policy.259 It seeks to improve access to, and the military
capability of, partner forces and their interoperability with U.S. and other friendly forces. In addition,
for more advanced allies like Australia and Japan,
security cooperation strives to assist in their regional
leadership roles of protecting security and stability.260
With emerging or rival powers like China, security
cooperation also works to deepen relationships to increase mutual understanding, reduce tensions, and
to pursue common objectives found in areas like humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.261
USPACOM organizes these shaping and engagement
activities through its Theater Security Cooperation
Plan (TSCP), in conjunction with each American embassy’s country plan, delegating activities to its service sub-components like USARPAC, MARFORPAC,
and SOCPAC as part of their “day-to-day mission
of . . . ‘fighting phase zero’.”262 U.S. landpower’s role
in security cooperation is particularly potent because
all states in the region have a corresponding land force
that tends to be the senior service in terms of domestic
influence, and because U.S. land forces like SOF and
regionally aligned conventional forces have developed
expertise in training and long-term relations with their
counterparts, which leverages their influence significantly.263 Throughout the Pacific region, for example,
USARPAC has conducted over 200 major bilateral
and multilateral TSCP events annually, including 26
major exercises, humanitarian responses and training,
key leader engagements, advise and equip foreign
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forces, peace operations training, personnel exchanges, reconstruction, conferences, information and intelligence sharing, military education, and many other
activities—with examples from the South China Sea
region presented below.264 Each of these security cooperation activities is meant to improve self-defense,
interoperability, and access in order to attain U.S. and
partner goals for regional security and stability.
Security cooperation is a wide-ranging collection
of U.S. military activities with regional forces. A part
of it is security assistance, which is the provision of
“defense articles, military training, and other defenserelated services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales
in furtherance of national policies and objectives,” as
overseen by the State Department.265 Although needed
arms, equipment, defense services, and schoolhouse
training may be directly purchased commercially by
other countries, in Southeast Asia defense articles
are usually obtained through the U.S. Government’s
foreign military sales (FMS) program. This program reinforces the advantages of engagement cited
throughout this monograph to include bolstering
each country’s self-defense and interoperability with
partners, reducing the cost of common systems, and
establishing enduring relationships and influence.266
The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), for instance, provides, sustains, and trains on
Army articles used by other countries, for which the
Pacific region has been a major customer, especially
for items such as helicopters and missile systems.267
Formal education and training are also part of FMS, in
which international students may attend U.S. military
schools, or U.S. teams train individuals and units at
their home stations using programs like International
Military Education and Training (IMET) administered
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by the military services’ security assistance agencies.
An example would be the Philippine, Malaysian, and
Vietnamese officers who attend the U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) annually or others who attend
technical training in the United States for a specific
weapon system.268
Outside of security assistance, security cooperation
takes such forms as exercises and military-to-military
engagement in the South China Sea region. Combined
exercises are effective tools for training with single and
multiple partner states, and for improving interoperability while familiarizing U.S. forces with local conditions and personnel. Within the region, exercises
leveraging recent U.S. land force experiences “that
focus on counter-terror, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, pandemic response, transnational crime,
and peacekeeping operations” are in demand and will
likely increase.269 One important exercise program
is USARPAC’s Pacific Pathways, meant to improve
multilateral interoperability and develop networks of
trust and understanding through three annual deployments meant to expand the Army’s role in the region
by projecting tailored and ready forces to participate
in sequential exercises for 3- to 4-month deployments
that optimize the cost of training, allow U.S. forces to
bring more and heavier equipment resulting in more
robust engagement, and offers flexibility in establishing a forward U.S. presence and improving interoperability. For example, in the 2016 Pacific Pathways,
the U.S. 2nd Stryker Brigade participated in sequential
bilateral exercises in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia with armored vehicles while monitored from a
forward command post set up at Fort Magsaysay in
the Philippines.270 Another example is one of the U.S.
military’s largest exercises, the annual Cobra Gold
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held in Thailand, with more than 30 countries participating, including Malaysia and Indonesia (or observing, like Vietnam), in a series of activities ranging
from live-fire combined arms combat maneuvers, to
disaster relief or humanitarian mission command post
exercises.271 The world’s largest multilateral maritime
exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is held in and
around Hawaii and includes land forces participating in realistic amphibious operations that were led
by a New Zealand Navy Commodore in 2016. The
more than 25,000 participants from 27 countries include members from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and China to a limited degree, and
the diversity is meant to sustain cooperative relationships.272 Forward deployed marines in Australia will
extensively train with their counterparts at local training ranges, and from there and from Okinawa, deploy
on shorter duration training exercises in the region,
especially amphibious operations and HA/DR missions for which there is increasing demand for Marine
Corps expertise. Improved interoperability could lead
to a “regional ‘amphibious architecture’ composed of
cooperative nations with capabilities that make them
better able to defend themselves and be more useful
partners,” both tactically and strategically.273
Shaping and engaging are also performed through
military-to-military relationships from the individual
to the unit level. The formal education and exercise
opportunities already cited are examples of building
such relationships. Other examples are the senior officer level dialogues, expert exchanges, and staff assistance visits that allow frank discussions on issues
that cross borders such as infectious diseases and military medicine, transnational crime, and natural disasters.274 USARPAC regularly hosts the Pacific Armies
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Chiefs Conference and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) for senior level officers from
across the Asia-Pacific region to engage one another
to “foster better understandings of the dynamic and
complex issues that affect all nations throughout the
region.”275 Similarly, MARFORPAC initiated the Pacific Command Amphibious Leaders Symposium
(PALS) in 2015 to include officers from 22 countries
including Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and Japan “to discuss each nation’s
goals while working with one another to strengthen
bilateral and multilateral relationships through future
engagements and training,” especially in HA/DR and
collective maritime domain awareness.276 Military exchanges with officers serving temporarily in the service of another country are also useful immersions in
understanding and interoperability, with Australian
Major General Richard Burr, for example, seconded
as the USARPAC Deputy Commanding General for
Operations from 2013 to 2015.277 U.S. marines serve on
military staffs in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
to improve amphibious capabilities, following the
model of the successful transformation of South Korea’s marines after years of association with their U.S.
counterparts.278 The U.S. Army’s Regionally Aligned
Forces (RAF), from Washington State’s I Corps to Hawaii’s 25th Infantry Division, brigade combat teams,
and Pacific Rim National Guard units, are assigned to
engage solely with Asia-Pacific states to:279
not only learn the specifics of a particular locality but
also gain a broader ability to rapidly develop situational understanding in the event of a contingency operation anywhere. They are expert in their combat skills,
and when coupled with U.S.-based global response
forces, these regionally aligned forces [RAF] provide
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a powerful blend of local knowledge and large-scale
capabilities that can execute the full spectrum of activities from security cooperation to support to counterterrorism to large-scale contingency response. . . .
The U.S. Army, along with special operations forces
and the U.S. Marine Corps, form the core of a global
landpower network.280

U.S. landpower’s ability to shape and engage results
in:
interactions with foreign defense establishments to
build defense relationships that promote specific US
security interests, develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.281

This is accomplished through BPC, military-to-military engagements, and security cooperation, at which
landpower excels. These strengths are best exemplified in the specific activities presented below involving Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and China.
Conflict with China and subsequent tensions in the
South China Sea have spurred Vietnam to improve
relations with the United States since the Vietnam
War.282 “Vietnam is the most capable and determined
Southeast Asian state to challenge China’s claims in
the South China Sea” and the most active in multilateral efforts to counter aggression.283 That provides sufficient mutual national interests for U.S. landpower to
meaningfully engage with Vietnam. USARPAC categorizes its engagement efforts at one of five levels (see
Figure 2), and Vietnam might be placed in the middle
“enhance critical capabilities” class defined as:
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countries that have expressed a desire for a closer
comprehensive security partnership with the United
States but lack the military resiliency and capacity to
exert significant military influence beyond their immediate borders. In many cases, these countries acknowledge the stabilizing influence of America’s regional
presence; however, direct or long-term employment
of U.S. forces could be objectionable, infeasible, or
counterproductive. USARPAC seeks opportunities to
improve relationships by enhancing specific capabilities, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
or disaster relief [italics in original].284

The military relationship with Vietnam is based on
a limited defense cooperation agreement signed in
September 2011 and enhanced in July 2015 to an “extensive comprehensive partnership” to guide future
military cooperation between the two.285 Nonetheless,
Vietnam has even closer strategic ties with India, Japan, and Russia, with the latter supplying nearly all of
Vietnam’s weapons, in a delicate diplomatic balance
in which China is prominent.286 To continue to build
relations, American and Vietnamese land forces have
engaged in high-level dialogues, humanitarian assistance agreements, combined search and rescue and disaster relief exercises, military training and education,
sharing of counterterrorism intelligence, and peacekeeping training.287 Such contacts flourish despite
Vietnam’s sub-standard human rights record because
these activities enhance the humanitarian nature and
promise of influence in improving civil-military relations and respect for civil rights.288
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Figure 2. USARPAC Theater Engagement
and Partner Design.289
Vietnam has identified illicit trafficking, transnational crimes, and illegal immigration as other areas
of concern in which U.S. landpower may fruitfully engage.290 For instance, since 2012, the Oregon National
Guard has been linked with the Vietnamese People’s
Army (VPA) through the State Partnership Program
(SPP). The distinctive state-federal and civil-military
characteristics of the national guard, and its experience in civil emergencies, border protection, natural
and man-made disaster preparedness, and combat
skills mutually builds both sides’ capabilities, crosscultural awareness, and international relationship
through long-term interaction.291 Peacekeeping operations are another area of mutual interest, and the U.S.
Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti-
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tute (PKSOI) assisted Vietnam to establish the Vietnam Peacekeeping Center in 2015 and 2016. The VPA
is also interested in learning advanced field medical
skills from its U.S. counterparts based on combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan.292 Some exercises
have been conducted too, including an army-to-army
combined exercise in urban search and rescue with
more sophisticated exercises possible.293 Another area
of potential interaction is with Vietnam’s capable but
under-resourced amphibious forces with which the
U.S. Marines could be influential through the PALS
regional amphibious network, yet remain HA/DRoriented and thus less likely to irritate Chinese-Vietnamese relations.294
In addition to exercises, training, and visits by
American personnel, a forward presence by U.S. land
forces was negotiated in 2016 with Vietnam hosting
U.S. Army prepositioned HA/DR reserves, including
a field hospital.295 The United States would like to expand its presence at Cam Ranh Bay, one of the best
natural harbors in the region and a major logistical
and intermodal hub for the United States during its
war in Vietnam.296 Facilities there currently repair U.S.
commercial and non-combat military logistics vessels,
and expanding access could eventually require U.S.
landpower’s wide area defense and port and logistics
services to maintain a major entry point into Indochina, and a facility from which to pursue security cooperation further. However, Vietnamese officials prefer
a non-committed use of its facilities, catering instead
to all of its strategic partners.297 Another aspect of improving relations is through FMS. In 2014, the United
States relaxed the ban on selling non-lethal military
equipment to Vietnam; and, in 2016, during a visit to
Vietnam, former President Obama opened sales for all
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military equipment on a case-by-case basis in order to
counter aggressive Chinese moves in the South China
Sea.298 Full access to U.S. arms has long been a goal of
Vietnam to show that relations with the United States
have been normalized and to improve its A2AD naval
and coastal defenses.299 U.S. landpower could assist
with some items needed by Vietnam, including artillery and missile systems; command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; helicopters; amphibious craft; and spare parts for equipment left by
the United States in 1975.300 U.S. land forces could also
be instrumental with the PVA-dominated military in
implementing a regional maritime domain awareness
initiative as it develops.301 U.S. landpower’s engagement with Vietnam is vital to enhance this military
partner’s civil and defense capabilities to meet common aspirations through training activities, visits,
dialogues, and prepositioning and sales of military
equipment that are part of greater shape and engage
operations.
Unlike Vietnam, Malaysia has maintained a long
cordial partnership with the United States. It also
maintains excellent relationships with its Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbors and
tries to balance good relations with China, but aggressive stances against Malaysian claims in the South China Sea and militarization of land features has resulted
in Malaysia’s Government hedging against Chinese
actions.302 The U.S. relationship with Malaysia may be
encapsulated by USARPAC’s engagement effort level
of “promote regional leadership,” defined as:
These countries have stated aspirations to expand
their regional influence generally in common with U.S.
interests and expressed their intentions and willing-
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ness to use their influence to assume a greater share of
future regional security responsibilities. Their defense
establishments demonstrate overall military resiliency
and increased professionalism . . . the U.S. now seeks
to promote key aspects of their military capacity to
achieve their regional security aspirations [italics in
original].303

Security cooperation between the United States and
Malaysia is strengthening, as is U.S. cooperation with
neighbors Indonesia and Brunei. The U.S.-Malaysian
partnership is manifest in diverse activities such as exercises between each country’s military services and
multinational maneuvers like Cobra Gold; combined
training especially in jungle warfare; exchange visits
and port calls; use of some U.S. military equipment
and a small amount of FMS funding; IMET with funding; and counter-piracy operations.304 There is no SPP
between the Malaysian military and U.S. National
Guard forces yet, but Malaysian and Bruneian officials
have shown some interest to follow Indonesia, which
has partnered with the Hawaii National Guard since
2006.305 The United States strives to sustain its friendly, relatively sophisticated relationship with Malaysia
through engagement in meeting their common goals
for security and stability in the region.
Although the Malaysian Army is the senior service
in the Malaysian Armed Forces, most of Malaysia’s
external threats (pirates, illegal immigration, Sulu
insurgents, and Chinese encroachment on Malaysian
South China Sea claims) are seaborne. The Malaysian
Army is addressing these by transforming one of its
paratrooper brigades into a new amphibious unit
based on the U.S. Marine Corps.306 The resulting interaction since 2014 is a model for landpower engagement. U.S. Marine Corps training assistance started
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with the Malaysia-United States Amphibious Exercise
2015 in North Borneo, consisting of training, planning,
and execution of combined amphibious air-ground
operations; a live-fire demonstration; and weapons
familiarization. In turn, jungle-fighting training was
led by Malaysian soldiers, and cultural exchanges of
sports competitions were included.307 The Malaysian
Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein stated such
exercises could “pave the way for future exercises in
Malaysia” and proposed that ASEAN “create a ready
group that focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities.”308 Another exercise, Keris
Strike, is an annual army-to-army engagement hosted
in Malaysia since 1996 to improve military readiness
and tactical interoperability. In 2015, key events were a
command post exercise; jungle field training; training
in unmanned aerial surveillance, medical response,
counter-improvised explosive devices; and an engineer civil action project. Keris Strike was also one of
the exercises included in the 2014 Pacific Pathways.309
Two other aspects of security cooperation with
Malaysia are forward presence and sales of military
equipment. The recurring training visits, exercises,
aircraft servicing, and an increasing number of naval
vessel port calls in Malaysia are supported by the 1994
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, which
also allows U.S. SOF to practice at the Malaysian
Jungle Warfare Training School.310 Malaysia has also
agreed to store U.S. Army prepositioned engineering,
water production, and transportation gear in the near
future. The Malaysian Government has a policy of
spreading military acquisitions among many sources,
so U.S. equipment is only modestly represented in its
ranks, but each of the Malaysian services uses the U.S.
M4 carbine rifle. The Malaysian Army also needs heli-
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copters to defend its South China Sea coastlines and is
in negotiations for the Bell AH-1Z Super Cobra attack
helicopter and MD 530G scout attack helicopter, and
currently operates a few Sikorsky H-60 Blackhawk
and S-61 Nuri utility helicopters.311 Good long-term
relations between the United States and Malaysia have
sustained strong landpower engagement between the
two in a variety of areas that benefit both countries’
strategic interests.
Since becoming treaty allies in 1951, and with colonial ties dating to the 1890s, U.S.-Philippine relations
have climbed and dipped, but in 2015 were at a zenith
in large part because of mutual efforts to combat terrorism and Chinese maritime aggression, before reaching
a nadir with President Duterte’s ambivalence toward
the United States.312 Nonetheless, this long-standing
treaty relationship with the Philippines is reflected in
USARPAC’s closest engagement level of “assure allies
and partners,” which are:
relatively sophisticated and long-standing defense
partnerships in which the U.S. seeks to assure partners
of its mutual defense commitment . . . what sets this
class of nations apart is a binding and durable commitment to take action together to counter shared
threats. . . . Exercises and engagements seek to reinforce interoperability. . . . Based on the importance of
these defense relationships . . . USARPAC Commander focuses the preponderance of resources, time, and
effort to maintain strong partnerships with them. Significantly, USARPAC often partners with MARFORPAC and SOCPAC in building ground force capacity
throughout the AOR, but particularly with these partners [italics in original].313
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Since 1998, the two states have renewed a Status of
Forces Agreement and, in 2002, established a Mutual
Logistics Support Agreement, which allowed a robust
schedule of exercises, military visits, and basing of operational activities such as JSOTF-P. The Philippines
military benefited from about 400 planned annual activities with U.S. forces, an active IMET program, and
the Excess Defense Articles Program (EDAP), which
transfers surplus U.S. military equipment at low or no
cost in order to modernize partner states.314 After long
neglect, the Philippine Government is modernizing
AFP defense capabilities with significantly increased
spending, and U.S. landpower can support some Philippine requirements for amphibious, wide area protection, and ocean and air surveillance and defense
capabilities, when relations improve in the future perhaps under or after the Trump administration.315 For
instance, the new Philippine National Coastal Watch
Center was built using a $20 million U.S. Government
grant; intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance,
and secure communications bolstered with $40 million; the Philippine Army received 100 excess M113
armored personnel carriers under the EDAP; and a
new program has been started to improve the Philippine Army’s air assault capabilities.316 Just as important, U.S. land forces can assist in improving the inadequate Philippine supply and logistics, maintenance,
and procurement processes at which the U.S. Army
and Marine Corps excel.317 Such continuing assurance
to a treaty ally, despite recent turmoil in relations, underscores the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines and gives legitimacy to the U.S. involvement in
the South China Sea.318
Land forces’ military-to-military relations between
the United States and the Philippines has traditionally
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been strong, based upon working together operationally to counter terrorism, in response to disasters, and
upon decades of training and exercising together. As
both homeland defense and disaster relief remain major missions of the Philippine Army, U.S. land forces
will continue their role in closely supporting them. The
Philippine Army would also like to build its capacity
to participate in peacekeeping operations in which the
U.S. Army has the expertise to share.319 Since 2000, the
U.S. National Guard units in Hawaii and Guam and
the Philippine military have also benefited from close
ties through the SPP, which complements and enhances the many other activities regularly occurring
between the two countries.320 The Philippine and U.S.
Marine Corps have long close ties with regular annual
amphibious landing exercises that improved the skills
and interoperability of both.321 Major exercises include
the biannual Balikatan, which, since 1984, focuses on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities and modernization. The 2016 exercise included
approximately 5,000 U.S., 3,500 Philippine, and 80
Australian defense personnel engaged in HA/DR scenarios and civic assistance to local communities. It also
added force integration training directed at maritime
security and territorial defense, and the possibility of
Japanese forces participating in the future.322 A second
long-running bilateral annual exercise, Philippine
Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX), focused
more on combined arms amphibious training including raids, beach landings, and live fire exercises—
which have recently been conducted near the Spratly
Islands and Scarborough Shoal—while also improving
interoperability for HA/DR crises. These 1- to 2-week
exercises included a civic assistance component such
as engineering projects to improve local infrastructure
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and health engagements.323 The results of such efforts
have been excellent military-to-military relations and
effective disaster relief responses, which is why their
current curtailment by the Duterte administration is a
definite setback. Despite these efforts, combat capabilities, like amphibious assault operations, still need to
be improved, because the Philippines was overly dependent upon the United States for its security, even
while it periodically distances itself from its U.S. ally
and leaves the United States in a difficult supporting
position.324
One of the biggest contributions the Philippines
makes to its U.S. partnership is offering a forward
presence in close proximity to the South China Sea.
The United States permanently stationed military forces in the Philippines for nearly a century until 1991,
when they were removed at the Philippine Government’s request. JSOTF-P reintroduced a U.S. presence
after the September 11, 2001 attacks, with expanded
rotational access for other U.S. forces allowed under
the ECDA after 2014.325 The subsequent Philippine Air
Force bases approved for U.S. use are Antonio Bautista AB (on Palawan), Basa AB and Fort Magsaysay
(on Luzon), Lumbia AB (on Mindanao), and MactanBenito Ebuen AB (on Cebu), with U.S. Marines rotating through the Philippine Marines headquarters at
Camp Aguinaldo, and requests to also use the former U.S. bases at Subic Bay and Clark International
Airport, both now major civilian commercial hubs.326
These are temporary U.S.-use installations where U.S.
forces may preposition equipment to enhance training, exercises, contingencies, and combat operations.
U.S. forces may also upgrade approved existing facilities and military infrastructure for combined use
at each location.327 Although the use by U.S. forces is
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rotational, there were opportunities for longer-term
forward presence in some cases. For instance, after
the departure of the 5,000 U.S. service members participating in Balikatan 2016, 275 remained behind with
some equipment at different locations, to be replaced
by other personnel later.328 Additional longer-term
deployments may follow, with more U.S. land forces
involved as their combat, contingency, and support
skills grow in demand and the U.S.-Philippine relationship builds, although a more balanced approach
in 2016 between China and the United States by the
new administration of President Duterte may moderate this.329 Should relations improve, regular forward
presence could leverage the effects of all other U.S.
engagement with the Philippines and other regional
states, and significantly strengthen U.S. deterrence
and combat positions by presenting more operating
locations, faster response to a contingency or crises,
and complicating an adversary’s targeting plan—all
to help assure a long-time U.S. ally.330
The most important engagement around the South
China Sea is between China and the United States, because how these ties develop in large part determines
the rest of the relationships in the region. Following
the political oscillations from World War II allies to
Cold War enemies, more recent military-to-military
relations between China and the United States are affected by internal events like the Tiananmen Square
protests, arms sales to and crises over Taiwan, or international freedom of navigation incidents sparked
by events like the EP-3E Aries II aircraft collision and
militarization of South China Sea features.331 Based
upon fluctuating historic ties and the conflicting signals from current events, analysts differ widely on
whether a U.S. strategy with China should be con-

70

frontational by directly countering Chinese actions
or indirectly through actions to enhance partners,
contain Chinese aggression from afar, or engage with
China to manage an internationally acceptable accommodation of its power. William “Trey” Braun, an Asia
and landpower expert at the U.S. Army’s Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI), sees the United States pursuing a “cooperative competitive strategy” with China
in economic and diplomatic affairs, but a “coercive/
confrontational competitive strategy” on military and
information lines, which challenges the American
public and its leaders to understand the “interplay between cooperative and coercive activity to avoid unintended consequences.”332 Despite these seemingly
conflicting strategy differences, Wikistrat analyst Dr.
Michael Lumbers sees an American military presence
in the Asia-Pacific region as necessary to support each
of these alternatives.333 The complex nature of military
relations between the United States and China stems
from concurrently and intermittently pursuing some
of these contradictory strategies so that military relations are affected by the entire spectrum of options,
from managing the rise of China into an international
order that its leaders understand is beneficial to its
interests, to remedying appeasement through unapologetic hard power, which still requires military
dialogue to manage “security competition and friction in a way that supports overall stability.”334 As
Chinese economic growth continues to slow and political, social, demographic, and environmental issues
need addressing, the present reduction in size and
professionalization of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) may offer an opportunity “to find face saving
settlements for the disputes now churning across every domain.”335 Indeed, one way to accomplish this is
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through robust and mature military relationships, for
which then-President Obama and Chinese President
Xi Jinping had jointly called for in 2014 and 2015.336
How the Trump administration will handle these relations is tenuous and may take time to unfold.
U.S. landpower will play a considerable role in
managing this military relationship with China’s land
force-dominated defense leadership—and intra-landforce relations have been steadily improving despite
recurring naval and air confrontations in the South
China Sea.337 For its part, USARPAC engages China
through its open category, in which U.S.:
legislative and policy constraints on defense relationships with these countries limit USARPAC’s ability
to directly engage them. . . . The countries themselves
may have a policy to limit engagements with the U.S.
military as a reflection of the state of the overall bilateral relationship. All of these factors limit USARPAC’s
engagement activities to senior level counterpart visits, medical, engineer, and HA/DR related exchanges—when allowed and where appropriate . . . USARPAC fosters responsible behavior through a focus on
common security challenges and expands open lines
of communication.338

Overcoming these limitations by developing “bilateral trust and transparency, the USARPAC Commander
actively seeks opportunities to work with China in
cooperative solutions to international security challenges.”339 Engagement and containment, even while
at odds with each other, is crucial in order to contain
crises and extend cooperative endeavors.340 Current
and previous PACOM Commanders, Admiral Harris
and Admiral Samuel Locklear, have stressed fostering
military relations with China even during heightened
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tensions to ensure communication and stability.341 In
the past, however, Chinese officials have used military contacts more as a signal of the state of diplomatic relations than as a tool to manage crises, although
during a 2015 U.S. freedom of navigation operation
close to Chinese occupied South China Sea features,
the PLA used a defense telephone link concerning
the incident.342 A delicate balance of engagement is
needed to continue such progress, even while “China
is . . . both a recipient of security cooperation and a potential competitor driving some U.S. regional security
cooperation efforts.”343
The range of military engagement is circumscribed
by the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2000,
which prohibits some activities and discussion of
certain topics with Chinese forces that could create
a national security risk; and China bars its members
from attending any U.S. school, although military-tomilitary contacts are allowed.344 Nonetheless, certain
themes of engagement are important and drive the
activities that ensue. For instance, senior leader dialogues are held to “develop common views on the international security environment and related challenges” in order to influence policy, cooperate on shared
interests like counterterrorism and peacekeeping, and
reduce tensions between the two states by improving
operational safety and building institutional interactions.345 Operational safety entails building confidence
and reducing the perception of threat through such actions as the exchange of information concerning force
size and composition, deployments and movement,
exercises, and protocols governing chance meetings
between forces.346 To accomplish these goals, Defense
One’s analyst Kedar Pavgi reports that military-tomilitary contacts have climbed since a low point in
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2010, consisting of only 7 military-to-military contacts,
5 of which were senior leader meetings, to about 25 in
2014, about half of which were exercise or educational
contacts. Chinese-U.S. military contacts now seem
less susceptible to being curtailed by adverse events,
although whether that continues depends on relations established by the new Trump administration.
Although the types of engagements are still clipped
by policy and personality, they allow contacts from
low-level exercises to cabinet secretary dialogues and
are best categorized as senior leader visits and discussions, non-traditional operations exercises and training, education, and other engagements—examples of
which are presented below.347
In terms of types and quantity of engagements,
senior leader engagements are the most numerous,
perhaps because they are the most reliable to control within legislative and policy restraints imposed
by both sides. These high-level engagements include
visits by the U.S. President, as Commander in Chief,
to China in 2009 and 2014; bilateral discussions at
international venues as occurred between the U.S.
Secretary of Defense and PRC Minister of National
Defense in Kuala Lumpur in 2015; and China’s Chief
of the General Staff of the PLA’s visit to the United
States in 2011.348 Because land forces dominate the
Chinese military structure, discussion between senior
land force leaders are especially important, as when
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff visited China in 2014.
In addition to building personal and organizational
relationships, these discussions should result in substantive agreements like the 2015 “army-to-army dialogue mechanism to better coordinate humanitarian
assistance and disaster response practices.”349 Highlevel engagements concerning education are another
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permissible topic as witnessed during the Commandant of the USAWC’s visit to the PLA’s Academy of
Military Science in Beijing in December 2015, or when
the PLA’s Peacekeeping Center discussed developing
conceptual materials concerning peacekeeping and
continuing their exchanges while visiting PKSOI at
Carlisle Barracks in November 2015.350 Such activities
should result in more substantive engagement such as
PLA officers attending the USAWC as international
fellows, or U.S. Army and PLA forces serving together in United Nations peace operations.351 Despite annual invitations, no PLA officer has ever attended the
USAWC. In a small step toward closer peace operations, a U.S. Marine officer attended the Peacekeeping
School in Beijing in 2015.352 Although high-level relationships are essential, more opportunities for lower
echelon personnel would give depth to engagement
as ties mature slowly over time and repeated encounters. Former U.S. Ambassador to China and PACOM
Commander Joseph Prueher related, “These personal relationships are more important than the formal
agreements . . . [but] we don’t have the amalgam that
holds it together at the lower level.”353 Steady rotation
of senior level U.S. officials to duties outside the region also detracts from more effective engagement.354
U.S.-Chinese engagement continues apace especially
among land forces, despite its detractors and slow
results, because of its potential to enhance cooperation in areas that concern both countries, and reduce
the potential for conflict between them—acting as a
regional stability insurance policy.
One form of engagement where all levels of land
force personnel can interact is non-traditional military
operations, once referred to as military operations
other than war. In order to better manage the com-
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petitive aspects of the Chinese relationship, the 2014
QDR recommends practical cooperation in a variety
of areas including peacekeeping, disaster relief, and
humanitarian assistance, which are major missions for
U.S. landpower.355 In order to burnish its image and
gain practical experience, the PLA is investing heavily in these types of missions, which make a natural
partnership between both forces, within the limits allowed them, because of the expertise and experience
each side brings.356 In disaster management, the two
armies are conducting training and exercises “increasing in number and increasing in quality and scope . . .
just short of a full-blown exercise.”357 For instance, in
2012, the PLA and U.S. Army held a tabletop HA/DR
exercise in Chengdu; 60 PLA soldiers exercised with
the National Guard in Hawaii in 2013; and, a Disaster Management Exchange was conducted on Hainan
Dao in 2015, with about 200 soldiers from each side
participating.358 Also in that year, a trilateral survival
exercise was held in the Australian Outback for the
second year.359 Although an observer since 2002, the
PLA participated in the Cobra Gold exercises for the
first time in 2014, but characteristically only in the
humanitarian assistance portions.360
Another area of potential cooperation in which
both armies have the expertise to share includes nation building, which “is one of the basic missions of
the PLA . . . [and] a historic mission for the United
States Army” offering natural venues to exchange
ideas on civil-military relations, the role of the military in development, and domestic and international
responsibilities.361 Peace operations are another common interest between the two, and when coupled with
nation building and HA/DR, could result in intriguing and substantive discussions over combined efforts
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to deal with failed or failing states, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and/or their
effects, or preventing terrorism.362 In the engineering
realm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees major river infrastructure projects that may be a valuable
exchange with the Chinese who also deal with potential disasters along the Yangtze, Yellow, and other rivers, the peril of earthquakes to major cities, and how
the destruction from each is mitigated.363 Although
engagements are now small and limited, with time
they could prove a boon to both sides for the expertise
exchanged, improvement in relations, and mitigation
of the real consequences of disasters.
Another type of engagement, forward presence,
may seem more difficult to derive benefits from with
the PLA, but here too gains may be found. As with
other states, high-level discussions, exercises, and
training are each a part of forward presence engagement with China. However, compared to other South
China Sea countries, these are sparse and lack any advantages of enduring interaction through personnel
basing or prepositioning of equipment. Indeed, U.S.
military forces’ simultaneous engaging and deterring
activities—congagement—makes forward positioning
of U.S. personnel and equipment with partner countries an irritation to relations with China and a perceived security dilemma that the Chinese vigorously
resist.364 From a combat and deter perspective, U.S.
forces in the region restrain Chinese options, as they
are intended to do. However, if Chinese intentions are
as cooperative as they claim, then current forward positioning of U.S. forces makes engagement stronger.
U.S. forces in close proximity to China means that opportunities and duration to engage in exercises and
training can increase, and it opens the door for mul-
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tilateral interaction with the forces of countries not
regularly encountered, as occurs during Cobra Gold.
Some analysts claim that the U.S. forces presence in
partner countries may also act “as a pacifier for the
more aggressive impulses of American allies and partners in the region,”365 much the same way that was
an unofficial role of American land forces with their
South Korean counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s. A
detached view of the American presence in the region
may see it as having a region-wide stabilizing effect
of restraining aggression on both sides while offering
venues to build confidence in one another and pursue
common interests with the United States as a facilitator, and “over time can improve cooperation when
policymakers are feeling friendly and reduce the
chance of accidental clashes when policymakers are
feeling prickly.”366 To date, the Chinese Government
has been wary of such an approach, but if there were a
breakthrough in such engagement, it would probably
be led by the land forces.367
U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states
and shape conditions should limit the need for deterrence or combat if properly performed. Through security cooperation and engagement activities, regional
states may better understand each other and ensure
stability and security to address U.S. and other states’
interests. U.S. landpower’s contribution to this is to
build partner capacity especially through interpersonal and organizational engagements with militaries dominated by their land forces, and engaged by
regionally specialized U.S. land forces. Security cooperation activities help to develop friendly forces and
interoperability through security assistance, the transfer of equipment and munitions, defense services, and
education and training. Security cooperation through
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military-to-military engagement also takes the form
of exercises and field training through programs like
Pacific Pathways and exercises like Cobra Gold, nontraditional military and combat missions, and senior
level and staff engagements through conferences and
visits like PAMS and PALS. The forward presence of
U.S. land forces through basing or prepositioning of
equipment reinforces the strengths and advantages
of shape and engage activities through enduring and
recurring ties, and reassuring partners and warning
adversaries of American commitment and resolve.
USARPAC’s levels of engagement are examples of
the different intensities of interaction with other land
forces including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and even rival China. HA/DR and peace operations
tend to be universally accepted cooperation activities,
while combat maneuvers or actual operations, as with
JSOTF-P, are reserved for close partners and allies. Engagement activities especially benefit ties with China,
which is the most difficult and consequential of the
relations, in order to build upon cooperation or mitigate crises. Thus of the three strategic U.S. landpower
roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent, and
engage and shape—the latter may be the most consequential in the disputes over the South China Sea.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Chinese word for crisis is sometimes misperceived as composed of the characters for danger and
opportunity based on common references ranging
from former U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s campaign speeches to the Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
lecture by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore.368
Despite being only partially accurate, this concept
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endures in the public mind as a useful touchstone for
making necessary, if difficult, changes during chaotic
times. The United States and East Asian countries are
in a turbulent period where such opportunities exist,
for good or ill. There is certainly much opportunity
here for U.S. land forces to better support U.S. interests in the region, as described in this monograph.
This section draws out, emphasizes, and elaborates
on some of the findings and recommendations already presented as relevant for land forces in a semienclosed maritime environment concerning aspects of
doctrine, operations, and engagement; organization;
training and exercises, and material. Although examined in select categories, many of these recommendations are interdependent, so that some solutions are
covered in other categories.
While significant opportunities may be grasped
during uncertain times, there are risks to these proposed changes including long-time U.S. fiscal constraints on some of the material and operational
recommendations, constraints that will probably
endure despite recent American campaign rhetoric.
Depending on how strict budgets become in addressing spending, the continuing low funding of U.S.
land force personnel, units, and equipment will make
their rebalance to Asia challenging and leave some of
the recommendations here simply never-resourced
requirements.369 A bigger problem for these recommendations, and in the forming and managing of
military and government policy of the future, is that
no real American grand strategy has been articulated
for a long time, which leaves military forces without
an adequate foundation to organize, train, and equip
forces, and vulnerable to competing priorities or halfmeasures if changes are started. Without the founda-
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tion of strategy and end states, the difficult trade-offs
envisioned in this monograph between strengthening
the security relationship with Vietnam, for example,
with building trust and cooperation with China may
come to naught as inconclusively debated or summarily reversed.370 The first recommendations of this
monograph then are to stabilize the policy environment through crafting a strategy to guide efforts and
then establishing actionable budgets and guidance to
attain strategic goals. Although these are obvious elements that have been long ignored, they are worth
stating again. Even should these necessary tasks be
completed, the implementation of changes in land
force posture, methods of fighting and engaging, new
and improving weapon systems, interoperability and
interdependence, and personnel and training will not
be easy in terms of foreign or domestic politics, but
are necessary.371 With all of these risks acknowledged,
what follows are some recommendations to advance
the role of U.S. land forces to fight, deter, or engage in
support of national objectives and military operations
in a semi-enclosed maritime environment, in general,
and in the South China Sea in particular.
Within land force operations, several advances attained during nearly 2 decades of combat in dry landlocked battlefields need to be sustained because they
are relatively inexpensive, powerful contributions to
joint and interagency operations. First, maintain and
strengthen the hard-won cooperation and interdependence between conventional Army and Marine forces
with each other and with SOF in their complementary
roles. As the demands of combat operations reduce,
too often so does trust and cooperation among the
land forces, as each seeks to protect service interests
and budgets, while separating into garrison routines.
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These stronger operational bonds may be taken for
granted, which can happen without strong leadership
and dedicated nurturing.
Also is the need to sustain and improve landpower’s foundational role in enabling support to joint forces, to open and set the theater, provide logistics, establish wide area security, and other critical supporting
contributions of landpower to air, sea, interagency,
and partner organizations, which are often overlooked
and thereby neglected in the interims between crises.
Sustaining the knowledge, expertise, and capabilities
that have been hard learned may require those skills
and tasks to be streamlined and balanced for greater
effectiveness. Lessons are expected from past and ongoing operations and should be applied to improve
these critical capabilities especially since short notice
operations and austere conditions are often encountered when U.S. forces deploy. These may be the most
important landpower contributions to semi-enclosed
maritime operations and should be reinforced.
One change to land force operations that will require organizational change and a doctrinal shift is
fully integrating and controlling improved or to-bedeveloped landpower projection capabilities into the
air and maritime domains. Overlapping weapon system threats and confined maneuvering areas fraught
with physical hazards make semi-enclosed maritime
environments particularly dangerous places for modern air and naval combat. This monograph proposed
that land forces stationed in the littorals should project air, sea, and land fires into this environment to
supplement air and naval power, or even provide the
shield behind which air and sea power become a mobile reserve, counter strike force, or act as a deterrent.
The specifics of these systems are discussed below,
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but to properly implement this concept, organizational and doctrinal changes are needed to fully integrate
joint and combined systems through a cross-domain
command and intelligence capability for collective regional defense. A mobile land-based C2 fires system
for semi-enclosed maritime regions would fill a U.S.
and partner capability gap that is especially apparent
around the South China Sea.
A mobile land-based cross-domain C2 system
would be less expensive, less vulnerable, larger and
more capable, more available, and less provocative
than similar air- or sea-based systems, and should include and sometimes depend upon partner country
capabilities. Such an integrated system would defend
air, sea, and land forces deploying to and operating in
the theater, and enable joint force entry operations.372
Adding maritime domain awareness capabilities as
an early warning of changing events in the maritime
domain would be a useful intelligence layer to build a
common operating picture so that participating states
could better coordinate responses. The current SEA
Reassurance Fund could be used to integrate and develop the capabilities needed to build and employ this
capability.373 The U.S. Army would be responsible for
providing many of the air-defense, surface-to-surface
fires, and potentially land-based anti-ship and surveillance systems needed for the endeavor that may
require adding and restructuring these elements and
developing a scheme to deploy these units.374 Operating the system in theater is a sign of resolve and
ensures that hosting states are fully committed to the
defense of the commons, including surveillance of piracy, terrorism, and other threats that would link the
interests of regional states along with their systems.
Doctrine, systems, and organization changes to real-

83

ize this recommendation are needed, with research
and acquisition necessary through U.S. and partner
efforts. A fully integrated cross-domain C2 system is a
much-needed capability to monitor and defend semienclosed maritime regions around the world, and a
land-based system fully integrating partners is a practical choice.
The second change to land force operations that
will require organizational and doctrinal change is
developing a small-unit boat-based land force capable of patrolling and controlling littorals and intraarchipelagic waters. To counter gray zone tensions
and nonstate actors’ disruptive actions, growing more
common in the South China Sea littoral, land forces
require an “assured shallow-water maneuver capability [that] fills a tactical and operational need” to support defensive, offensive, stability, and humanitarian
actions by land forces. Such a force properly trained
and equipped could, for example, conduct raids or
reconnaissance in the brown waters of a coastline or
within the Spratly archipelago, as an example; provide counter-terrorism and other security services
around friendly forces; interdict trafficking or pirates;
and provide humanitarian services and disaster relief
in shallow but navigable waterways or remote areas
only accessible by such vessels. Since many of Southeast Asia’s countries’ problems are water-related, but
its forces are land-centric, such a small-unit boat force
is a natural engagement match with regional powers
and thus satisfies the combat, deterrence, and engagement missions of U.S. land forces.375 The Marine Corps
is the best fit to perform this mission, but soldiers have
conducted this task in the past and may have more
personnel and capability to expand in this direction.
Although this is a mission not conducted by U.S. forces
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since the Vietnam War, the obvious requirement and
current uncertainty and changes in the political environment, both foreign and domestic, may now make
this the time to consider instituting such capability.
Daily engagement and support to regional partners and allies is a powerful but relatively inexpensive
way to achieve U.S. and regional partners’ goals—a
tool that needs to be strengthened. If, as Dr. David
Lai of SSI contends, China’s strategy mirrors the ancient Chinese game of go, then its recent moves of
seizing the center of the board in the South China Sea
through building up and militarizing the Spratly and
Paracel Islands may be countered by the United States
working the game board’s edges, remaining fully engaged with Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
other involved regional powers.376 In his inaugural address, however, President Trump may have signaled
a weakening of support and engagement with likeminded partners when he proclaimed, “For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense
of American industry, subsidized the armies of other
countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of
our military.”377 This monograph and other authorities believe that reducing engagement activities with
key regional countries would ultimately be an expensive and debilitating mistake.378 Instead, engagement
should be increased and strengthened, with land forces
in the lead, because of their stabilizing and defensive
nature in a land forces-dominant region, as already
presented. For reasons of its own new administration’s
policies, this may be particularly difficult to continue
with the Philippines. However, even here, continuing
influential ties and activities at lower echelons and in
much-needed activities, below the headline levels of
more fraught large exercises and equipment sales, are
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desirable to maintain personal relationships and force
capabilities until official relationships allow more
broad engagements again. While official relationships
between the United States and the Philippines remain
muted, landpower ties with the forces of Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia should be deepened.
The Trump administration is already actively engaged
in strengthening ties with Taiwan, perhaps playing an
unexpected edge of the go game board.
Despite recent downgrading by the Philippines,
training and exercising with Southeast Asian powers
has been mutually beneficial, and should be maintained and diversified. International exercises like
Cobra Gold allow states that might not otherwise
engage with the United States or the Philippines, like
China, to participate together in a variety of operating
environments.379 U.S. Army, Marine, and SOF each
conduct their own bilateral exercises with regional
states, often emphasizing particular missions or tasks
of which USARPAC’s Pacific Pathways program is
an effective example of wisely engaging in various
bilateral exercises, and should be continued. These
bilateral exercises should concentrate on training activities sought after by partners. For instance, the U.S.
Army could advance its cooperation in establishing a
peacekeeping center with the VPA to the next level of
running peacekeeping field and command post exercises or planning actual operations. The VPA is also
interested in acquiring advanced field medical skills—
with which U.S. land forces have much combat experience—and continuing urban search and rescue drills,
all of which are examples of non-controversial ways
to continue engagement despite Chinese protests. A
more substantial step would be bolstering Vietnam’s
already capable amphibious forces through exercises
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and training with the U.S. Marine Corps. The Malaysian Army’s nascent amphibious force would benefit
too from increased training and exercise with the Marine Corps that the Malaysian Defense Minister appears to support.380 For reasons such as these, the DoD
needs to make sure that security cooperation remains
an important tool for engagement despite possible
political sentiment otherwise.
Engagement with more wary countries is both possible and necessary. The Philippine Army would also
like to increase its abilities in peacekeeping, which
is an entrée to which even the Duterte administration might not object, and could have the benefit of
becoming a trilateral effort with Vietnam or perhaps
even China. A more substantial but difficult activity
would be to continue building the Philippine’s air assault capability, which is much needed in its jungle
and insular environment. Maintaining continuity in
this and other U.S.-Philippines training and exercise
efforts would be advantageous for Philippine forces
but are uncertain in the current political environment.
Relations with China have made military engagements, at the level described here, tenuous activities.
Recent moves by the Trump administration have
probably hampered any form of engagement for some
time to come. Nonetheless, contact between U.S. and
Chinese forces would at least reduce tensions, and the
possibility for misunderstanding and miscalculations.
U.S. land forces are the most likely to spearhead any
future cooperation. Senior level military dialogues
would air out challenges between the two sides and
perhaps find some common views. As noted earlier
by former U.S. Ambassador and USPACOM Commander Joseph Prueher, such personal relationships
with Chinese officials “are more important than the
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formal agreements” and should be fostered.381 The
usual less contentious activities for relationships like
this could re-establish ties including student exchanges, and practical cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, HA/DR, and natural disaster mitigation and
infrastructure projects in which both sides’ land forces
have much expertise.
Improvements to training and exercising are always necessary, but two main ideas are suggested
here. Although joint and combined exercises like Cobra Gold are very useful, and single-service bilateral
exercise can focus training for better results, more USARPAC exercises should include U.S. Marine and SOF
elements in their exercises to maintain joint interoperability and increase access for the other services—and
their exercises should do the same. A second suggestion comes from a 2016 USAWC study that recommends strengthening regional partner capacity with
regional leaders like Australia and Japan, where the
United States should assist in helping them develop
regional defense operations through organizing and
executing their own “Pathways” exercises. The report
stated that:
this initiative offers a unique opportunity for the participating nations to deepen cooperation and relationships among themselves . . . to increase regional military involvement and leadership among Asia-Pacific
partners, providing regionally led security, stability,
and cooperative defense.382

These proposed “Reverse Pathways” would not only
increase and strengthen regional powers’ capacities,
but would also share some of the burdens of cooperation activities, and multiply the strands in the defense
network of like-minded states as insurance against
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one relationship souring. For instance, recently difficult relations between the United States and the Philippines allow Japan to continue anchoring relations
with the Philippines. Malaysian Defense Minister
Hishammuddin Hussein has proposed that ASEAN
“create a ready group that focuses on humanitarian
assistance and disaster response capabilities,” which
is one form such an idea might take.383
Unit-to-unit engagement with regional states is
a relatively inexpensive, rapid, and effective way to
enhance access and operations in maritime environments, so expanding existing RAF and SPPs makes
sense. Because of their importance as individual states
and even more so as a bloc, the SPP should expand to
cover all 10 ASEAN states to tighten their cooperation
and collective actions.384 Partnering with Malaysia and
Brunei is especially important since both are directly
impacted by the South China Sea disputes, and their
officials have shown some interest in the program.385
To increase stability and security in Southeast Asia,
the SPP should focus on threats to stability and legitimacy including “disaster response, consequence management [CM], border and fixed site security, cyber
defense, counter terrorism and counter trafficking,” as
well as improve partner resiliency in light of ongoing
gray zone operations.386 These focus areas are particularly well suited to the civil-military expertise that National Guard units bring to cooperative engagements,
especially when interacting with civilian authorities.387 A limited number of training days available to
Guardsmen, however, has constrained this program
and should be corrected through more resources, as
intended by the Army Chief of Staff, or more innovative methods employed for engaging.388
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Both the U.S. Army National Guard, through the
SPP, and SOF have aligned their units to better understand a region—gaining practical expertise and
insight. As former TRADOC Commander General
Robert Cone emphasized, “if we can just get the first
four brigades on the ground, anywhere we go, to be
conversant in language, culture, and networks, then
we will be far ahead of where we were in Iraq and Afghanistan.”389 To achieve such regional awareness, the
U.S. Army and Marine Corps active forces and their
reserves should be regionally aligned as well, to enhance combat and engagement actions, especially in
HA/DR and foreign internal defense. Such customizing of RAF, initiated in the U.S. Army in 2012, is a challenge because many rival tasks compete for manpower, especially in a force as small as the Marine Corps.
Assigning a continuum of scalable or smaller units to
specialize and engage in a region would be one way
to address this concern.390 Although well intentioned,
however, such alignments are prone to breaking down
during the periods between crises, so an institutional
change to keep personnel in units longer and to reassign them back to maintain regional focus should be
considered, perhaps through a regimental system.391
The U.S. Marine Corps, already notorious for splitting into East Coast and West Coast “tribes,” may
be further along such regional forces alignment than
they think, especially with a large contingent of personnel permanently in Okinawa and Guam. Aligned
forces must also be funded to exercise in their region
and given the training needed to properly prepare for
regular deployments and maintain their readiness.392
Individual training to create specialists is also necessary to maintain regional expertise, ranging from the
well-regarded Army Foreign Area Officer to the Strategic Broadening Seminar for non-commissioned and
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warrant officers.393 Within the human domain, more
culturally aware personnel, policies, and activities are
crucial for landpower’s effectiveness in combat and
peacetime engagement, because, as respected SSI author Steven Metz concludes, “Most, if not all, U.S. military operations will continue to be cross-cultural.”394
For deterrence and combat capabilities, a landbased cross-domain C2 system has already been
proposed, but improvements to the joint and allied
systems that are part of such an integrated network
are needed. For instance, competent anti-air systems
like Patriot and THAAD exist, but, as presented earlier, their capabilities need to be extended to cover
the wider spaces of a maritime environment, and
their capabilities need to be upgraded to counter the
sophisticated A2AD systems fielded by the Chinese.
Enough of these systems are not available for worldwide commitments, so more Patriot and THAAD air
defense units are needed to protect vital U.S. bases
in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and forward deployed
bases that U.S. military forces might need in order to
counter aggressive moves in the South China Sea.395
Anti-ship capabilities for U.S. land forces do not
exist yet, but if pursued, as advocated by this monograph, making existing systems dual purpose for covering this mission is a good initial first step. The U.S.
Army should fully pursue its programs of using the
existing M777 155 mm howitzers to fire hypervelocity
projectiles and the Excalibur precision guided munition for initial land-based mobile, short-range antiship weapons. In the longer term, the United States
should work with partners like Japan and Vietnam,
who are already developing anti-ship systems, to ensure interoperability in hardware, doctrine, and tactics, and C2 to attain an effective long-range anti-ship
capability, which has U.S. Senate backing.396
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ATACMS upgrade in range and ability to track
slow-moving targets could cover much of the region’s
sea- and land-based threats out to 500 km when better
integrated into a cross-domain C2 system. Such a system further complicates an aggressors plan and contributes to deterrence. However, such systems when
fully fielded also increase offensive capability for land
forces, which could be controversial internationally,
and are significant expansions to roles, missions, and
costs for land forces during fiscally constrained times,
which could be controversial domestically.397 Nonetheless, if the United States is serious about supporting its partners and allies around the world’s littorals,
and deterring aggression in the marginal seas, more
funding, research, development, and acquisition are
necessary.398
There are other recommendations suggested in
this monograph that may be more practical in the
long term than in the present political environment,
so those are only covered briefly. Forward presence
forces, temporary host-nation facilities, and prepositioned logistics sites are important tools for combat,
deterrence, and engagement in order to reduce deployment time, costs, and vulnerability; show commitment in the region; and enhance interoperability,
understanding, and networks with partners.399 The
Trump administration and some U.S. partners seem
less interested in employing these force-enhancing
tools; however, pursuing them should be done selectively with the hope for better prospects in the
future. To compensate, forward-postured, sea-based
land forces, such as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Amphibious Readiness Groups’ Marine Expeditionary Unit,
should substitute when and where land-based forces
lack access, as well as be properly funded to ensure
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availability and readiness for when such forces are
needed.400 Another postponed opportunity is greater
engagement with Chinese forces. Without enhancing
China’s fighting capabilities, engagement on a variety
of levels is needed to build relationships, understanding, and trust during crises and opportunities when
these are needed. Despite political circumstances, engagement should continue as a fundamental aspect of
the relationship, but the Chinese have used engagement as a carrot for their diplomatic purposes, and the
Trump administration seems little inclined to use its
soft power instruments with China. Nonetheless, as
much engagement as may be salvaged should continue, in order to have some framework ready when political winds shift and engagement is needed again.401
CONCLUSION
U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region
during America’s strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps,
and SOF offer distinctive capabilities whose defensive
nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment
tend to escalate less while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve
to partners and competitors alike. The capabilities of
U.S. landpower are also essential to augment other
activities in the air, sea, and human domains in the
South China Sea through direct support to diverse
joint military operations, intergovernmental activities
in pursuit of U.S. strategic interests, and in landpower’s own engagement, deterrence, and strategic combat roles. U.S. landpower gives pause to states with
aggressive intentions, creates networks that enhance
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abilities synergistically, and may also break down barriers to misunderstanding—all of which should result
in a stabilizing role for U.S. landpower through its
proper application in the South China Sea region.
To establish U.S. landpower as a critical part of
security and stability in the region, this monograph
presented how its wide-ranging capabilities have an
important influence on the land and human domains
rimming the South China Sea, and that directly support U.S. interests pursued by all of its government
agencies. Even in a sea- and air-dominated environment, landpower’s broad operational and strong
support capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent joint and unified operations make it an indispensable element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower may be the most decisive, flexible, and versatile
force through full spectrum operations, fully covering
the range of military operations from humanitarian
assistance to conventional state-on-state warfare, and
is also crucial to understand, engage, and influence
people and leaders. If the United States is to channel
tensions in the region toward internationally acceptable forms of growth, prosperity, stability, and security, U.S. landpower holds special influence because
land forces dominate this region’s military structure.
Landpower’s capabilities are crucial for attaining the
United States’ national security interests of peace and
stability in the South China Sea region.
The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to
compel or fight and win decisively, is more important
than is normally credited in a maritime environment.
The U.S. Army provides indispensable support to
other forces and agencies through its theater opening and sustaining abilities as lead military service in
logistics, land transportation, communications, medi-
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cal, and other support. Through its core competency
of wide area security, the U.S. Army, often with the
Marine Corps, is usually responsible for passive and
active means to protect forces, populations, and infrastructure against external and internal threats. The
Army’s air and missile defense systems are particularly needed in this A2AD environment against preemptive strikes. The security role of sea control from
the land through anti-ship missiles is a historic and influential one in a semi-enclosed sea environment, but
still needs to be operationally developed by U.S. land
forces. The counterland mission through surface-tosurface missiles acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems located around the region. Another core
competency is combined arms maneuver. Amphibious operations, a mission assigned to all landpower
forces, are a useful option during disasters and in the
periphery of combat operations around the South
China Sea. Maneuver by air offers another option but
is also vulnerable in the current threat environment.
Landpower’s combat capability is a measure of last
resort, but does give credibility to landpower’s deter
and engage strategic roles.
The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower, to deter and prevent war, is also crucial to stability in Southeast Asia. Credible U.S. deterrence in the
region depends on the combat capabilities of U.S.
landpower covered in this monograph. However, deterrence also needs to exhibit the will to back those capabilities, which is demonstrated through the forward
presence of troops and prepositioning of equipment
and supplies. The advantages of forward positioning
can be gained through using hardened, dispersed, or
temporary facilities. U.S. landpower’s ability to help
mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security
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related or natural or manmade disasters, is another
means to show resolve and capability in the region,
as demonstrated by JSOTF-P and JTF 505 operations
in the Philippines. The importance of landpower to
deterrence and preventing war is due to the resolve
that land forces represent when committed by the U.S.
Government, and the powerful influence landpower
wields in the human aspects of military operations.
With forward presence and operational interaction
with the forces of Southeast Asia, U.S. forces have
more opportunity to assure partners while improving
host nation military capabilities and interoperability
through the shaping and engagement actions of security cooperation.
U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states
and shape conditions may well reduce the need for
deterrence or combat. Through security cooperation
and engagement activities, regional states may better
understand each other and ensure stability and security to address U.S. and regional states’ interests. U.S.
landpower builds partner capacity through interpersonal and organizational engagements with militaries dominated by their land forces. Security cooperation activities also help to develop the capabilities of
friendly forces and regional interoperability through
security assistance, equipment, defense services, and
education to partners from the United States. Security cooperation also takes the form of exercises and
field training, military-to-military engagement exercises, non-traditional military and combat missions,
and senior level and staff engagements. The forward
presence of U.S. land forces reinforces the strengths
and advantages of shaping and engagement activities
for which multiple examples were given for Vietnam,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and even rival China in a
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manner in which ties become more enduring and recurring. Although all three of the U.S. landpower strategic roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent,
and engage and shape—are mutually dependent upon
each other, engage and shape may be the most important in stabilizing the disputes in the South China Sea.
The use of landpower to address the disputes in
the South China Sea is not usually considered in what
is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater,
but the role of U.S. landpower is profound in this arena. Should the situation come to conflict, sea and air
power may be the “big stick” of fighting in the South
China Sea region with U.S. landpower support, but it
is landpower that will speak softly, and its influence
will be undeniable in deterring war or, should that
fail, winning the peace.
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